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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of shareholder oppression protects the close corporation minority stockholder from the improper exercise of majority
control.! Nevertheless, when a close corporation minority shareholder

I. The terms "majority shareholder" and "minority shareholder" (or "majority" and "minority") are used in this Article "to distinguish those shareholders who possess the actual power
to control the operations of the firm from those who do not." J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P.
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asserts that the majority shareholder has acted "oppressively" towards
him, the minority's chance of success may very well depend on the
perspective from which shareholder oppression is viewed. Consider
the following two decisions:
In Priebe v. O'Malley, the controlling shareholders of a close
corporation terminated the employment of Myron Priebe, a minority
shareholder, for "unsatisfactory" work performance.! Priebe sued,
asserting that the termination amounted to oppressive conduct! The
trial court noted that "Priebe was not producing sales and that he was
not working well with other employees."" As a consequence, the trial
court found that the controlling shareholders had a "legitimate business purpose" for the termination.5 The Priebe court affirmed the
denial of relief, observing that "[b]ased on this record, we cannot find
that the majority lacked a legitimate business purpose for breaching
its fiduciary duty to Priebe if, in fact, this duty was breached."'
In Balvik v. Sylvester, Elmer Balvik was the minority shareholder of a two-person close corporation." The majority shareholder
openly questioned Balvik's job performance and ultimately terminated
him as an employee of the company Balvik sued, alleging in part that
the majority shareholder was "guilty of oppression and malice by
discharging him from employment with the corporation."' Despite the
majority's problems with Balvik's job performance, the court concluded that oppressive conduct had occurred:
We find little relevance in whether [the majority shareholder] discharged Balvik from
employment for cause .... The ultimate effect of these actions is that Balvik clearly has
been "frozen out" of a business in which he reasonably expected to participate. As a result, Balvik is entitled to relief.10

Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close
CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (1977). Such power is most often determined by the
size of the shareholdings. See id.
2. See Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E.2d 573, 574-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
3.
See id. at 575. Because Ohio defines oppressive conduct as the majority shareholder's
breach of a heightened fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholder, see Crosby v. Beam, 548
N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989), the minority shareholder actually sued for breach of this fiduciary
duty. See Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 575; see also infra text accompanying note 60.
4.
Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 575. There was also evidence that 'Priebe was converting corporate property to personal use, that he was not working full daily hours, and that he threatened to
shut down the company." Id. at 575-76.
5.
Id. at 575.
6.
Id. at 576.
7.
See Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384 (N.D. 1987).
8.
See id. at 384-85 & n.1. Aside from stating that the majority shareholder "also questioned Balvik's job performance," the opinion gives no further information on the performance
problems that the majority perceived. Id. at 384.
9.
Id. at 384-85.
10. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
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Although Priebe and Balvik arose in different jurisdictions, the
cases share a number of factual similarities. In both cases, the employment of a minority shareholder was terminated. In both cases, the
minority's poor job performance was cited as a justification for the
termination. Finally, in both cases, the minority shareholder asserted
that the discharge amounted to oppressive conduct. Despite these
similarities, only the Balvik court granted relief.1 In Priebe, the controlling shareholder's justification for the discharge greatly influenced
the court's conclusion that no oppressive conduct had occurred. In
Balvik, however, such a justification was essentially considered irrelevant to the court's oppression
analysis and to its eventual conclusion
2
that relief was warranted.

What explains these different outcomes? Why is the majority's
justification critical in Priebe, but not in Balvik? To answer these
questions, one must recognize that the analyses of the Priebe and
Balvik courts illustrate divergent approaches to the shareholder oppression doctrine. On the one hand, the Priebecourt views shareholder
oppression from a majority perspective-a perspective that focuses
primarily on the propriety of the majority's conduct. On the other
hand, the Balvik court views shareholder oppression from a minority
perspective-a perspective that focuses primarily on the effect that
majority conduct has on the minority. Whereas a majority-perspective
court finds oppression liability when the majority's actions are not
justified by a legitimate business purpose, a minority-perspective
court generally finds oppression liability when majority actions,
whether justified or not, harm the interests of a minority shareholder.
Put differently, because the majority perspective focuses primarily on
the propriety of the majority shareholder's conduct, the majority's
justification for its actions is critical to an oppression analysis. Because the minority perspective focuses primarily on the effect of such
majority conduct, however, the majority's justification is of little to no
importance in the oppression analysis.'3

11. Compare Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 388 (granting relief), with Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 576
(denying relief).
12. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6, 10. It is worth noting that the employment at
will doctrine does not explain why relief from termination was granted in Balvik but not in
Priebe. Indeed, because neither opinion mentioned an express or implied employment agreement, both Balvik and Priebe were likely at-will employees. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the employment at will doctrine to close corporation
disputes).
13. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the majority and minority perspectives of shareholder
oppression).
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Despite this distinction, some courts and commentators have
characterized the majority and minority perspectives as "not contradictory" and having "little difference" in practice." To be sure, these
characterizations are entirely accurate for the "freeze-out' cases 5 that
typify the reported decisions on shareholder oppression.' 6 Indeed, the
choice of oppression perspective makes very little difference in these
extreme cases, as oppression liability will likely be found under either
perspective. 7 Cases outside the freeze-out context have arisen, however, and they will undoubtedly continue to arise as the oppression
doctrine develops further. 8 In such cases, the choice of oppression
perspective plays a critical role. The Priebe and Balvik decisions, for
example, illustrate that the success or failure of a shareholder oppression claim may turn entirely on whether a court views the oppression
doctrine from a majority or minority perspective. It may be time,
therefore, to move beyond the "not contradictory" and "little difference" characterizations, particularly because such characterizations
may unintentionally suggest that the choice of perspective lacks importance. By moving to a more nuanced discussion of the distinctions
between the perspectives, it becomes possible to focus on the virtues
and drawbacks of the majority and minority approaches and to determine which of the competing views is superior. 9

14. More precisely, some courts and commentators have described the oppression definitions that reflect the majority and minority perspectives as "not contradictory" and having "little
difference" in practice. See, e.g., 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 9.29, at 132-33 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS]
('These three standards for determining oppression are not contradictory, as conduct that
violates one of them may well also violate the others.'); 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7:13, at 80 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter O'NEAL, OPPRESSION] (same); Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension:
Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 322 (1990) ("Although courts
focusing on the majority's duty of utmost good faith and loyalty and courts focusing on the
minority's reasonable expectations do take different approaches, in practice, there is little
difference."); see also Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (observing that
the various oppression formulations "will frequently be found to be equivalent"); infra text
accompanying notes 59-62, 69-70 (describing the three principal approaches to defining oppression).
15. "Freeze-out" cases involve egregious majority conduct that is designed to deprive the
blameless minority shareholder "of business income or advantages to which [the minority is]
entitled." 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:01, at 1-2; see infra text accompanying notes
38-47 (describing a freeze-out); infra note 17.
16. See, e.g., Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 10 (S.D. 1997) (describing freeze-out
situations as "typical of oppression cases).
17. See infra Part IV.C.1. (describing the operation of the perspectives in the freeze-out con-

text).
18. See Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 10 ("While freeze-out or squeeze-out situations may be
typical of oppression cases, they are not exclusive.").
19. Cf. Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (2000) (noting that "there has been no cause to choose between the
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This Article argues that the majority and minority perspectives
do represent divergent approaches to the shareholder oppression
doctrine. By exploring the operation of the perspectives in their "pure"
and "modified" formulations, this Article contends that the choice of
perspective can make an outcome-determinative difference in a number of cases. More importantly, however, this Article confronts the
harder question that courts and commentators have not adequately
considered-from which perspective should shareholder oppression be
viewed? This Article maintains that the shareholder oppression doctrine should operate to protect the minority's investment and to preserve, at least to some extent, the majority's decision-making
discretion. As a consequence, the Article concludes that the "modified"
minority approach-an approach that incorporates both minority and
majority interests-is the superior oppression perspective.'
To reach this conclusion, hypothetical bargains between reasonable close corporation shareholders are constructed and informed
assumptions about the results of those bargains are made. In so doing,
the Article argues that the modified minority perspective is the only
approach that enforces the likely understandings that reasonable
investors would have reached if, at the venture's inception, they had
bargained over the protection of their investments and the prerogatives of the majority."' Indeed, because the close corporation investment is typically comprised of more than a mere financial stake in the
corporation's success, this Article asserts that reasonable close corporation shareholders would not reach an understanding that any majority conduct benefiting the corporation is permissible.' Courts
should recognize, in other words, that the majority perspective of
oppression is flawed due to its implicit assumption that reasonable
close corporation shareholders are solely concerned with maximizing
the profits of the business. Because the modified minority perspective
recognizes that profitable and "legal" corporate conduct must be prohibited in certain circumstances, such a perspective is a superior
approach to the shareholder oppression doctrine.
To put this Article in context, one should understand that
"[c]lose corporations account for most of American business."" Indeed,

competing [majority and minority] approaches" because "most litigated cases have been easy
cases," but suggesting that "[i]n hard cases, the distinction between the [majority and minority]
conceptions of the majority's fiduciary duty in the close corporation context might well be
relevant").
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part V.C-D.
22. See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
23. See Bahls, supra note 14, at 287.
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"[flamily-owned businesses alone represent ninety-five percent of all
United States businesses and are responsible for nearly fifty percent
of the jobs in the United States."' Moreover, the number of new business incorporations in this country has reached peak levels.' As a
consequence, the issues discussed in this Article affect an enormous
number of companies as well as individuals.
It is important to note that this Article discusses which approach to the shareholder oppression doctrine is superior. Whether the
shareholder oppression doctrine should exist at all, however, is a
separate question that is beyond the scope of this Article. 6 Moreover,
because "[m]any would argue that the denial of employment [to a
shareholder] is a classic example of oppression,"" and because numerous litigated cases involve shareholders challenging their terminations
as oppressive, this Article will often use an employment discharge as
an example of allegedly oppressive conduct. It bears mentioning,
therefore, that in most close corporation disputes involving terminated
shareholders, the employment at will doctrine should not be viewed
as a barrier to relief.' Indeed, the author has previously taken such a
position and this Article proceeds on the assumption that the position
is valid.'
Part II of this Article provides needed background information
by discussing the nature of the close corporation, the development of
the shareholder oppression doctrine, and the defining characteristics

24. Id.
25. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMIc INDICATORS 18 (1998) ("[N]ew
business incorporations are ... at their peak record levels for the last ten years.").
26. One could argue that if close corporation shareholders do not contract for protection,
they should be governed by traditional public corporation norms and not by a special close
corporation doctrine. Such an argument, of course, challenges the basic legitimacy of the shareholder oppression doctrine and, consequently, is beyond the scope of this Article.
27. Robert W. Hillman, The DissatisfiedParticipantin the Solvent Business Venture: A Considerationof the Relevant Permanenceof Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN. L. REV.
1, 46 n.141 (1982); see also id. at 80 n.250 ("Few would deny that the denial of employment as a
squeeze-out technique is 'oppressive'... "); id. at 78 (The classic example of what, in a given
situation, may be a substantial expectation is employment.").
28. In general, the employment at will doctrine "allows an employer to terminate an employee with or without just cause in the absence of an agreement limiting the employee's discharge to just cause or specifying the term of employment." Sandra L. Schlafge, Comment, Pedro
v. Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held Corporationsand the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (1992) (footnote omitted).
29. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, ShareholderOppression v. Employment at Will in the Close
Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 531 n.65 (citing cases
where terminated shareholders were granted relief on oppression grounds with no mention of the
employment at will doctrine).
30. See id. at 536-68 (arguing that the shareholder oppression doctrine can protect close
corporation employment without intruding into the legitimate coverage of the employment at
will rule).
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of the majority and minority perspectives. Parts III and IV explore the
distinctions between the perspectives by examining them in their
"pure" and "modified" formulations. By considering the presence or
absence of two variables--"majority fault!"1 and "minority fault"--in
varying combinations, these parts demonstrate that the perspectives
reach different results when particular fact patterns are at issue.
Finally, Part V argues that the "modified" minority approach is the
superior oppression perspective given that it protects the minority's
investment and preserves the majority's control in conformity with the
likely understandings of the shareholders.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
A. The Nature of the Close Corporation
A close corporation is a business organization typified by a
small number of stockholders, the absence of a market for the corporation's stock, and substantial shareholder participation in the management of the corporation.' In the traditional public corporation, the
shareholder is normally a detached investor who neither contributes

31.

'Majority fault" is used in this Article to refer to the majority's lack of a legitimate busi-

ness purpose for its allegedly oppressive actions. Conversely, the absence of majority fault
indicates that the allegedly oppressive actions were supported by a legitimate business purpose.
32. '%4linority fault" is used in this Article to refer to misconduct or incompetence on behalf
of the minority shareholder (e.g., theft, failure to learn the business) that harms the corporation
and that brings about the majority's allegedly oppressive actions (e.g., a termination of the
minority's employment). If minority fault is present, it indicates that the minority shareholder is
to blame in some manner for the challenged majority conduct. Conversely, if minority fault is
absent, it indicates that the minority's own actions have not had any role in bringing about the
challenged majority conduct.
33. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairnessin the Law of Close Corporations,16
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1990) ("Close corporations have a limited number of shareholders, and most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in the corporation's day-to-day
business.").
There is some variation in the definition of a close corporation. See WILLIAM L. CARY &
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 389 (7th ed. 1995) (unabridged) ("Exactly what constitutes a close corporation is often a matter of theoretical dispute.
Some authorities emphasize the number of shareholders, some the lack of a market for the
corporation's stock, and some the existence of formal restrictions on the transferability of the
corporation's shares."); 1 'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 1.02, at 4-7 (noting the
following possible definitions of a "close corporation": a corporation with relatively few shareholders; a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the securities markets; a corporation in which the participants consider themselves partners inter se; a corporation in which
management and ownership are substantially identical; and any corporation which elects to
place itself in a close corporation grouping). Nevertheless, the typical close corporation possesses
most, if not all, of the attributes described in these various definitions.

2000] THE UNANSWERED QUESTION OFPERSPECTIVE

757

labor to the corporation nor takes part in management responsibilities.34 In contrast, within a close corporation, "a more intimate and
intense relationship exists between capital and labor."35 Close corporation shareholders "usually expect employment and a meaningful role
in management, as well as a return on the money paid for [their]
shares."' Moreover, close corporation investors are often linked by
family or other personal relationships that result in a familiarity
between the participants."
Conventional corporate law norms of majority rule and centralized control can lead to serious problems for the close corporation
minority shareholder.38 Traditionally, most corporate power is centralized in the hands of a board of directors.39 In a close corporation,
the board is ordinarily controlled "by the shareholder or shareholders
holding a majority of the voting power."4 Through this control of the
board, the majority shareholder has the ability to take actions that are
harmful to the minority shareholder's interests. Such41actions are often
42
referred to as "freeze-out!' or "squeeze-out' techniques that "oppress"

34. See 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 1.08, at 31-32.
35. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW.
699, 702 (1993).
36. Id.; see, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ("[Ihe primary
expectations of minority shareholders include an active voice in management of the corporation
and input as an employee."); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 7.02, at 4 ("Ownership and management frequently coalesce in closely held corporations, where not uncommonly
all the principal shareholders devote full time to corporate affairs. Even where one or two
shareholders may be inactive, the business is normally conducted by the others without aid from
nonshareholder managers."); infranotes 189-90 and accompanying text.
37. See Robert B. Thompson, CorporateDissolution and Shareholders' ReasonableExpectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196 (1988).
38. See 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:02, at 3-4 (characterizing majority rule
and centralized management as the "traditional pattern of corporate management," and noting
the dangers that this management pattern presents to close corporation minority shareholders);
Thompson, supra note 35, at 702-03 ("In a closed setting, the corporate norms of centralized
control and majority rule easily can become instruments of oppression.").
39. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1993) [hereinafter RMBCA] ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the
corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors .. .'); Kleinberger, supranote
33, at 1152 ("In traditional theory, ultimate authority resides with the board of directors .... ).
40. Kleinberger, supra note 33, at 1151-52; see also 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14,
§ 1:02, at 3 ("Indeed, in most closely held corporations, majority shareholders elect themselves
and their relatives to all or most of the positions on the board.').
41. See 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:01, at 3 n.2 ('The term 'freeze-out' is often
used as a synonym for 'squeeze-out.'"). It has been noted that the term "squeeze-out" means "the
use by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside
information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate
from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants." Id. at 1. Similarly, a "partial
squeeze-out" is defined as "action which reduces the participation or powers of a group of participants in the enterprise, diminishes their claim on earnings or assets, or otherwise deprives them
of business income or advantages to which they are entitled." Id. at 1-2. See generally 1 O'NEAL,
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the close corporation minority shareholder. Common freeze-out techniques include the termination of a minority shareholder's employment, the refusal to declare dividends, the removal of a minority
shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning off of
corporate earnings through high compensation to the majority shareholder.43 Quite often, these tactics are used in combination. For example, the close corporation investor typically looks to salary rather than
dividends for a share of the business returns because the "[e]arnings
of a close corporation often are distributed in major part in salaries,
bonuses and retirement benefits."" When actual dividends are not
paid, therefore, a minority shareholder who is discharged from employment and removed from the board of directors is effectively denied
any return on his investment as well as any input into the management of the business.45 Once the minority shareholder is faced with
this "indefinite future with no return on the capital he or she contributed to the enterprise,"46 the majority often proposes to purchase the
shares of the minority shareholder at an unfairly low price."

OPPRESSION, supra note 14, §§ 3:01-3:20, 4:01-4:08, 5:01-5:39 (discussing various squeeze-out
techniques); 2 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supranote 14, §§ 6:01-6:10 (same).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61 (describing judicial definitions of "oppression").
43. See 1O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supranote 14, §§ 3:04, 3:06, 3:07, at 18-21, 44-50, 66-68; see
also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975) (noting some of the
possible freeze-out techniques).
44. 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 1.08, at 32; see Kleinberger, supra
note 33, at 1148 (Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather than dividends.").
Reasonable salaries paid to employees of a close corporation can be deducted by the close corporation when calculating its taxable income "and will thereby reduce the amount of income tax
that the company pays." Thompson, supra note 37, at 197 n.12 (citing I.R.C. § 162). Dividends
paid to close corporation shareholders, however, cannot be deducted by the corporation. As a
consequence, corporate income paid as dividends is subject to double taxation-once as business
income at the corporate level, and once as personal income at the shareholder level. See id.
Because of the tax system's discouragement of dividends in favor of salaries, "most close corporations provide a return to participants in the form of salary or other employee-related benefits."
Thompson, supra note 35, at 714 n.90; see also 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:03, at
4-5 ("[A] close corporation, in order to avoid so-called 'double taxation,' usually pays out most of
its earnings in the form of salaries rather than as dividends.").
45. See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) ("Balvik was ultimately
fired as an employee of the corporation, thus destroying the primary mode of return on his
investment. Any slim hope of gaining a return on his investment and remaining involved in the
operations of the business was dashed when Sylvester removed Balvik as a director and officer of
the corporation.'); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 1.15, at 89 ("An investor
taking a minority investment position in a close corporation, expecting to receive a return on the
investment in the form of a regular salary, would face the risk that, after a falling out among the
participants, the directors would terminate the minority shareholder's employment and deprive
that investor of any return on the investment in the corporation.").
46. Thompson, supra note 35, at 703; see 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14,
§ 1.16, at 96 ("If, for example, the minority shareholder is fired from the employment that was
providing the return on the investment in the close corporation, the minority may face an
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In the public corporation, the minority shareholder can escape
these abuses of power by simply selling his shares on the market. By
definition, however, there is no ready market for the stock of a close
corporation.48 Thus, when a close corporation shareholder is treated
unfairly through termination or otherwise, the investor "cannot escape
the unfairness simply by selling out-at a fair price."49
B. The Cause of Action for Oppression
Over the years, state legislatures and courts have developed
two significant avenues of relief for the "oppressed" close corporation
shareholder. First, many state legislatures have amended their corporate dissolution statutes to include "oppression" by the controlling
shareholder as a ground for involuntary dissolution of the
corporation.s Moreover, when oppressive conduct has occurred, actual
dissolution is not the only remedy at the court's disposal. Both state
statutes and judicial precedents have authorized alternative remedies

indefinite period with no return on the investment.'); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of
Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholdersand Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 447 (1990) ("[Ihe primary vulnerability of a minority shareholder
is the spectre of being 'locked-in,' that is, having a perpetual investment in an entity without any
expectation of ever receiving a return on that investment.").
47. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) ("Majority
'freeze-out' schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish
stock at inadequate prices. When the minority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair
value, the majority has won." (citations omitted)); 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note
14, § 8.13, at 68 (noting that "[a] squeeze out usually does not offer fair payment to the
'squeezees' for the interests, rights or powers which they lose"); Thompson, supranote 35, at 70304 (noting that in a classic freeze-out, "the majority first denies the minority shareholder any
return and then proposes to buy the shares at a very low price').
48. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ("In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital.
By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation.'); Brenner v.
Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1027 (N.J. 1993) ("[U]nlike. shareholders in larger corporations,
minority shareholders in a close corporation cannot readily sell their shares when they become
dissatisfied with the management of the corporation.'); 2 'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra
note 14, § 9.02, at 4 ("[A] shareholder in a close corporation does not have the exit option available to a shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who can sell his shares in a securities
market if he is dissatisfied with the way the corporation is being operated.'); Thompson, supra
note 35, at 703 ("[Ihe economic reality of no public market deprives investors in close corporations of the same liquidity and ability to adapt available to investors in public corporations.'); see
also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 230-31 (1991) (noting that "the lack of an active market in shares" prohibits close corporation shareholders from creating "homemade dividends" by selling stock).
49. Kleinberger, supra note 33, at 1149.
50. See Thompson, supra note 35, at 708-09 & n.70. See generally Murdock, supra note 46,
at 452-61 (describing the development of oppression as a ground for dissolution).
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that are less drastic than dissolution.5 1 As the alternative forms of
relief have broadened over the years, orders of actual dissolution have
become less frequent.' Thus, "oppression" has evolved from a statutory ground for involuntary dissolution to a statutory ground for a
wide variety of relief.'
Second, particularly in states without an oppression-triggered
dissolution statute, some courts have imposed an enhanced fiduciary
duty between close corporation shareholders and have allowed an
oppressed shareholder to bring a direct cause of action for breach of
this duty.' In the seminal decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted such a fiduciary
duty along with a pro-minority "equal opportunity" rule:
The controlling group may not, consistent with its strict duty to the minority, utilize its
control of the corporation to obtain special advantages and disproportionate benefit
from its share ownership.

51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 1 (West Supp. 2000) (authorizing any equitable relief and specifically authorizing a buyout of the shareholder's interest); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1999) (providing a nonexclusive list of possible relief that includes the
order of a buyout and the appointment of a provisional director or custodian); Brenner, 634 A.2d
at 1033 (Importantly, courts are not limited to the statutory remedies [for oppression], but have
a wide array of equitable remedies available to them.'); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383,
388-89 (N.D. 1987) (listing alternative forms of relief for oppressive conduct such as appointing a
receiver, granting a buyout, and ordering the declaration of a dividend); Masinter v. Webco Co.,
262 S.E.2d 433, 441 & n.12 (W. Va. 1980) (listing ten possible forms of relief for oppressive
conduct such as ordering the reduction of excessive salaries and issuing an injunction against
further oppressive acts). But see Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (Va. 1990) (stating
that the dissolution remedy for oppression is "exclusive" and concluding that the trial court is not
permitted "to fashion other ... equitable remedies').
52. See Thompson, supranote 35, at 708; cf. Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close CorporationDissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
25, 53 (1987) (finding that courts ordered remedies other than dissolution in the majority of 37
involuntary dissolution cases studied). See generally Murdock, supra note 46, at 461-64 (discussing the development of alternative remedies).
53. See 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 9.29, at 132 ('The inclusion of
'oppression' and similar grounds as a basis for involuntary dissolution or alternative remedies
has opened up a much broader avenue of relief for minority shareholders caught in a close
corporation wracked with dissension.'); Thompson, supra note 35, at 708-09 ("[I]t makes more
sense to view oppression not as a ground for dissolution, but as a remedy for shareholder dissen-

sion.').
54. See Thompson, supra note 35, at 726; see also id. at 739 ("It should not be surprising
that the direct cause of action is developed particularly in states without an oppression statute,
and [it] provides a vehicle for relief for minority shareholders in a close corporation where the
statutory norms reflect no consideration for the special needs of such enterprises.'). See generally Murdock, supra note 46, at 433-40 (discussing the development of the shareholder fiduciary
duty).
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We hold that, in any case in which the controlling stockholders have exercised their
power over the corporation to deny the minority such equal opportunity, the minority
shall be entitled to appropriate relief,-"

The development of the statutory cause of action and the enhanced fiduciary duty reflect "the same underlying concerns for the
position of minority shareholders, particularly in close corporations
after harmony no longer reigns."' Because of the similarities between
the two remedial schemes, it has been suggested that "it makes sense
to think of them as two manifestations of a minority shareholder's
cause of action for oppression.""7 In the close corporation context,
therefore, it is sensible to view the parallel development of the statutory cause of action and the enhanced fiduciary duty action as two
sides of the same coin-i.e., the shareholder's cause of action for oppression.
C. Viewing Oppressionfrom Majority and Minority Perspectives
The development of a cause of action for oppression gives rise
to a difficult question for courts: when has oppressive conduct occurred? Such an inquiry is complicated because of the competing concerns present in all oppression lawsuits-i.e., the need to protect
minority shareholders and the desire to preserve majority discretion.'
In wrestling with these concerns, the courts have developed three
principal approaches to defining oppression. First, some courts define
oppression as "'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct.., a visible
departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair
play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company

55. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515, 518-19 (Mass. 1975); see also
Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) (' Majority or controlling shareholders breach
such fiduciary duty to minority shareholders when control of the close corporation is utilized to
prevent the minority from having an equal opportunity in the corporation.").
It should be noted that the Donahue "equal opportunity" rule was later scaled back by the
same court. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976)
(stating that allegedly oppressive conduct does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty if the
controlling group "can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action); infra notes 6668 and accompanying text.
56. Thompson, supranote 35, at 739.
57. Id. at 700. See generally id. at 738-45 (describing the "combined cause of action for oppression").
58. See, e.g., Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353-54 (Ind.1977) ("On the one hand is
the .necessity to provide adequate protection for the interests and expectations of minority
shareholders, and the other is the necessity of allowing sufficient corporate flexibility, as is
required by modern commerce.'); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 ('The majority, concededly, have
certain rights to what has been termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation which should be
balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority.).
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is entitled to rely.' ,,'
Second, some courts link oppression to breach of
an enhanced fiduciary duty owed from one close corporation shareholder to another. ' Third, some courts give meaning to oppression by
equating it with conduct that "defeats the 'reasonable expectations'
held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise."61
The formulation of these definitional approaches reveals a distinction in the perspective from which shareholder oppression is
viewed. Both the "wrongful conduct" and "fiduciary duty" approaches
define oppression from a "majority" perspective by linking the oppression analysis primarily to the propriety of the majority shareholder's
conduct." If the majority's conduct is sufficiently improper to be characterized as wrongful or a breach of fiduciary duty, a finding of oppression is warranted. Of course, "proper" majority conduct, standing
alone, is a term without meaning. Accordingly, majority perspective
courts have generally linked proper majority conduct to actions that
are justified by a legitimate business purpose.' The majority perspective of oppression, therefore, focuses on preserving the majority's
discretion to make decisions in furtherance of a legitimate business
purpose-a standard that is typically satisfied when majority actions
benefit the corporation.' Correspondingly, however, the majority

59. Thompson, supranote 35, at 711-12 (alteration in original) (quoting Fix v. Fix Material
Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)); see, e.g., Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d
214, 221 (Mont. 1981); see also Haynsworth, supra note 52, at 36-39 (describing judicial definitions of oppression).
60. See, e.g., supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
61. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984); see 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 9.29, at 132; see also infra note 70.
62. See Hillman, supranote 27, at 45 (describing the "wrongful conduct" approach as "a traditional approach under which severe misconduct [of the majority shareholder] is required for a
finding of oppression" (footnote omitted)); id. at 49 (noting that the "wrongful conduct" approach
is "consistent with a reluctance to grant relief unless the conduct of those in control is sufficiently
overreaching that it warrants 'punishment' "); infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (stating that allegedly oppressive action does not
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty if the controlling -group "can demonstrate a legitimate
business purpose for its action'); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440-41 (W. Va. 1980)
(citing the "wrongful conduct" definition and suggesting that conduct justified by a 'legitimate
business purpose" is not oppressive).
64. See, e.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A] 'legitimate business purpose' must be a legitimate purpose for the corporation." (emphasis omitted));
Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 854 (Mass. 1988) (linking a legitimate business purpose
to a 'legitimate corporate purpose'); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492
N.E.2d 1112, 1118-19, 1122 (Mass. 1986) (linking a legitimate business purpose to a "valid
corporate purpose" and to action that "further[ed] the interests of the corporation').
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perspective is somewhat less concerned with the protection of the
minority shareholder."
One of the more significant decisions to express a majority perspective of oppression is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.' In
Wilkes, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts scaled back the
Donahue fiduciary duty and suggested an oppression framework that
linked the doctrine directly to the propriety of the majority's conduct
and to the issue of a legitimate business purpose:
[W]hen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the majority, we must
carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders in the individual
case. It must be asked whether the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate
67
business purpose for its action.

Moreover, the court's language echoed the majority perspective's
emphasis on preserving the controlling shareholder's decision-making
discretion:
[We are concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith standard enunciated in Donahue... will result in the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by
the controlling group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness
in managing the corporation in the best interests of all concerned.... [W]e acknowledge the fact that the controlling group in a close corporation must have some room to
maneuver in establishing the business policy of the corporation. It must have a large
measure of discretion, for example, in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding
whether to merge or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees.6

65. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 27, at 49 ('The traditional approach to the concept of oppression.., focuses more on the character of the actions by those in control than it does on the
impact that those actions may have on minority shareholders."); cf. Bahls, supra note 14, at 322
("Historically, courts did not focus as sharply on the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders, but focused instead on wrongful conduct of the majority shareholders.'); Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 1, at 11 ("[A] broad spectrum of management conduct may not be sufficiently
culpable to constitute grounds [for dissolution] under the statute, even though the minority finds
such conduct sufficiently objectionable to make it want to terminate its investment." (footnote
omitted)).
66. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d 657.
67. Id. at 663.
68. Id.; see also Chesterton, 128 F.3d at 7 (noting that the legitimate business purpose defense established by Wilkes was intended to protect "business discretion").
There is some question as to whether Wilkes can be characterized as a decision that reflects a
greater concern with managerial discretion than minority protection. Indeed, the Wilkes court
also noted that when the majority asserts a legitimate business purpose for its allegedly oppressive conduct, "it is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate
objective could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the
minority's interest." Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added). Although this language is
potentially significant, it is unlikely that it will be construed to favor minority interests over
majority prerogatives. See infra Part IV.A.; infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
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A very different perspective of oppression, however, focuses the
analysis not on the propriety of the majority's conduct, but on the
impact that majority actions have on the minority. This "minority"
perspective emphasizes protecting the interests of the minority shareholders over preserving the discretion of the controlling group. The
"reasonable expectations" approach exemplifies such a minority perspective' by linking oppression to majority conduct that frustrates the
reasonable expectations held by a minority shareholder at the time he
decided to join the venture." Indeed, in describing the reasonable
expectations standard, the New York Court of Appeals focused primarily on the harm to minority shareholders that potentially results
from majority action:
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle
him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or
some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the
corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.

69. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 27, at 49-50 (observing that an oppression approach that
focuses on the impact of majority actions upon minority shareholders "'is probably best defined
in terms of the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders in the particular circumstances at hand' ") (quoting Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority
Shareholders: A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1063 (1969)); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use
and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
456, 504 (1985) (observing that the reasonable expectations analysis "[c]hannel[s] the inquiry
away from assessing fault"); Thompson, supra note 37, at 219-20 ('CThe increasing use of the
reasonable expectations standard reflects a move away from an exclusive search for egregious
conduct by those in control of the enterprise and toward greater consideration of the effect of
conduct on the complaining shareholder, even if no egregious conduct by controllers can be
shown."); id. at 210 ('The increasing legislative and judicial tendency to define oppression by
reference to the reasonable expectations of shareholders... [has] pushed the focus of the dissolution remedy beyond fault of the controlling shareholders."); see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634
A.2d 1019, 1029 (N.J. 1993) ("Focusing on the harm to the minority shareholder reflects a
departure from the traditional focus, which was solely on the wrongdoing by those in control, and
reflects the current trend of recognizing the special nature of close corporations.").
70. See supra text accompanying note 61; see also In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d
1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that oppression liability can arise when expectations that were
"central to the petitioner's decision to join the venture" are defeated); In re Burack, 524 N.Y.S.2d
457, 459 (App. Div. 1988) (same).
Some commentators caution that a reasonable expectations inquiry should look "to the
shareholders' reasonable expectations as they existed at the inception of the enterprise.., and
as they developed thereafter through a course of dealing." 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS,
supra note 14, § 9.30, at 143. It is conceded, however, that primary emphasis should be on the
"participants' original business bargain" because "the most significant bargaining occurs at the
initial stage of the enterprise." 2 'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 7:15, at 91; see Thompson, supra note 37, at 218.
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[O]ppression should be deemed to arise... when the majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner's decision to join the venture.71

Thus, the principal definitions of oppression used by the courts
reflect two distinct perspectives of oppression. Whereas the majority
perspective focuses primarily on the conduct of the majority shareholder, the minority perspective focuses primarily on the effect of that
conduct on the minority shareholder. 2 Determining whether the majority's conduct was proper and in furtherance of a legitimate business
purpose is central to the majority perspective of oppression. In contrast, determining whether the minority's expectations were harmed
is central to the minority perspective of oppression. 3
It should be noted that this discussion has provided only generic descriptions of the majority and minority perspectives. The pure
and modified formulations of the perspectives, however, are more
nuanced than these generic descriptions suggest. Indeed, the formulations greatly differ in the degree to which they consider majority and
minority interests. To fully appreciate these differences, the formulations will require more particularized descriptions.

III. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE "PURE" PERSPECTIVES OF
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
It is a useful starting point to consider the majority and minority perspectives of oppression in their extreme or "pure" formulations that have been suggested by some judicial decisions.

71. Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty
in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1727 (1990) (observing that the reasonable
expectations approach "focus[es] on minority interests').
72. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meisehman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 566-67 (N.C. 1983) (finding that the
trial court erroneously adopted a majority perspective by focusing "on any possible egregious
wrongdoing" by the majority shareholder, and noting that a proper minority perspective would
inquire into whether the "rights or interests" of the minority shareholder "are in need of protection").
73. It is important to note that the perspective from which oppression is viewed is not always identifiable from the definitions used by a court. Indeed, some courts cite both majorityperspective and minority-perspective definitions of oppression in their opinions. See, e.g., Balvik
v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387-88 (N.D. 1987) (citing the fiduciary duty and reasonable
expectations definitions); Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 107 & n.10 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing the wrongful conduct, fiduciary duty, and reasonable expectations definitions,
and noting that "[w]e view the broad 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct' definition we
have adopted as including consideration of the frustration of the reasonable expectations of
shareholders, when that is appropriate'); see also Thompson, supra note 35, at 711 (observing
that "courts have used at least three phrasings [of oppression], sometimes in combination');
supratext accompanying notes 59-61.
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A. The Pure Majority Perspective
The pure majority perspective of oppression concerns itself
solely with the propriety of the majority's conduct. Under such a perspective, the majority's justification for its actions plays the pivotal
role, as conduct justified by a legitimate business purpose is protected
from judicial sanction. 4 In contrast, the detrimental effects of majority
conduct on minority interests are of no relevance to a pure majority
court. 5 Minority interests, in other words, are not considered at all.
The decision of Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. nicely exemplifies the pure
majority perspective of oppression. 6 In Zidell, a non-employee minority shareholder asserted that the controlling group was distributing
"unreasonably small" dividends while corporate salaries and bonuses
were increasing substantially." The minority shareholder argued that
the controlling group was making a "concerted effort.., to wrongfully
deprive him of his right to a fair proportion of the profits of the business."78 Although agreeing that the minority shareholder had shown
"factors [that] are often present in cases of oppression or attempted
squeeze-out by majority shareholders," the court showed a lack of
concern for the minority's position by declining to take action. 9 Instead, the court accepted the defendants' justification for the conservative dividend policy and refused to award relief.' As the court stated,
"'[i]f there are plausible business reasons supportive of the decision of
the board of directors, and such reasons can be given credence, a

74. See, e.g., Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) ("Where majority or controlling shareholders in a close corporation breach their heightened fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders by utilizing their majority control of the corporation to their own advantage,
without providing minority shareholders with an equal opportunity to benefit, such breach,
absent a legitimate businesspurpose, is actionable." (emphasis added)); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560
P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977) ("[Tjhose in control of corporate affairs have fiduciary duties of good
faith and fair dealing toward the minority shareholders .... [T]hat duty is discharged if the
decision is made in good faith and reflects legitimate business purposes rather than the private
interests of those in control.").
75. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 71, at 1716 (noting that cases "concede that legitimate
business reasons for the complained-of conduct would immunize the controlling interests from
liability, even though the conduct resulted in harm to the beneficiary or disproportionate benefit
to the fiduciary); F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppresssion of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority
Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 125 (1987) (noting that "many courts apparently feel that there
is a legitimate sphere in which the controlling (directors or) shareholders can act in their own
interest even if the minority suffers').
76. See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Or. 1977).
77. Id. at 1087-88.
78. Id. at 1088.
79. Id. at 1089-90.
80. See id. at 1090. The court noted that "[d]efendants introduced a considerable amount of
credible evidence to explain their conservative dividend policy," and the court cited numerous
corporate "needs" that required the retention of company earnings. Id.
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Court will not interfere with a corporate board's right to make that
decision.'"...
As Zidell illustrates, the pure majority perspective emphasizes
preserving the majority's decision-making discretion and exhibits no
concern for the minority's position. Even if minority interests are
harmed, oppression relief will be denied as long 2as the majority's
conduct is justified by a legitimate business purpose.1
B. The Pure Minority Perspective
In contrast to the pure majority perspective, the pure minority
perspective is wholly unconcerned with the propriety of the majority's
conduct. Such a perspective is premised upon safeguarding the minority shareholder and its sole concern is the absolute protection of
the minority's reasonable expectations. Any majority actions that
harm those expectations-even actions justified by a legitimate business purpose-will trigger oppression liability."
The decision of In re Topper reflects a pure minority perspective.' Myron Topper was a minority shareholder, employee, and officer
of two' close corporations.' The controlling shareholders "discharged
[Topper] as an employee, terminated his salary, [and] .

.

. removed

him as an officer."' Topper subsequently sought judicial dissolution of
the two corporations by arguing that his discharge as an employee and
his removal as an officer constituted "oppressive actions" under the
applicable New York statute.87 In response, the controlling shareholders attempted to raise a legitimate business purpose defense by arguing that "they discharged Topper with justification and, thus, their

81. Id. at 1089 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577,
580 (Me. 1975)).
82. Cf. Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 650 (Tenn. 1997) (upholding the termination of a
close corporation shareholder because there was "no evidence that the termination of ... employment or [the] discharge as an officer and a director were prejudicial to the corporation's best
interest").
83. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411
N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987).
84. Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359.
85. See id. at 361. Topper owned 33% of each corporation's stock. See id.
86. Id. at 362.
87. At the time of the Topper decision, § 1104-a(a) of the New York Business Corporation
Law stated in part that the "'holders of twenty percent or more of all outstanding shares'" of a
close corporation could sue for dissolution on the grounds that "'[tihe directors or those in control
of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders.' " See id. at 362-63 (quoting N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a(a), 1104a(a)(1) (McKinney 1979) (amended 1998)).
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conduct escapes statutory sanction."' The Topper court, however,
squarely rejected this majority-centered argument in favor of a pure
minority perspective:
Whether the controlling shareholdersdischarged petitioner for cause or in their good
business judgment is irrelevant.The Court finds that the undisputed understanding of
the parties was such at the time of the formation of the corporations that the respondents' actions have severely damaged petitioners reasonable expectations and constitute a freeze-out of petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed to be
"oppressive" within the statutory framework. 9

As this passage indicates, the Topper court gave no consideration to
the propriety or justifiability of the majority's conduct. Instead, the
court focused its oppression analysis solely on the damage to the petitioner's reasonable expectations.
The literal language of Topper as well as Balvik suggests that
if the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder are frustrated, any justification for the majority's conduct is "irrelevant."' If
this language is accepted at face value, oppression liability would arise
even if the minority shareholder was terminated for his own misconduct or incompetence." When such improper conduct is present, how-

88. Id. at 361. The opinion does not specify the precise nature of the controlling shareholders' alleged business justification.
89. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 362; see Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) ("little relevance');
supra text accompanying notes 7-10, 84-89 (discussing Balvik and Topper); see also Gunzberg v.
Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (App. Div. 1985) (affirming a finding of
oppression and noting that "[e]ven if there were sound business reasons for the corporation's
actions, it is clear that the ultimate beneficiary was [the controlling shareholder], not petitioners
[the minority shareholders]'); Hillman, supra note 27, at 46 n.141 ('Many would argue that the
denial of employment is a classic example of oppression regardless of whether those in control
have good reasons for their action." (emphasis added)); D. Prentice, Protection of Minority
Shareholders, 1972 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 124, 145 (1972) ("It is irrelevant whether or not the
majority are acting bona fide, what matters is the consequence of the majority's act and not the
motive underlying it.").
91. Even the decision of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984), arguably
supports this proposition. As the Kemp court observed:
The purpose of this involuntary dissolution statute is to provide protection to the minority shareholder whose reasonable expectations in undertaking the venture have been
frustrated and who has no adequate means of recovering his or her investment. It would
be contrary to this remedial purpose to permit its use by minority shareholders as merely
a coercive tool. Therefore, the minority shareholder whose own acts, made in bad faith
and undertaken with a view toward forcing an involuntary dissolution, give rise to the
complained-ofoppressionshould be given no quarter in the statutoryprotection.
Id. at 1180 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This passage suggests that even minority
misconduct or incompetence is not a bar to oppression relief so long as the minority's actions
were not intended to force an involuntary dissolution. Literally read, the termination of a
minority shareholder for stealing from the business may be oppressive if the theft was motivated
by greed rather than by a desire to dissolve the company. See, e.g., In re O'Neill, 626 N.Y.S.2d
813, 814 (App. Div. 1995) (noting that "[a minority shareholder's] illegal acts do not bar him from
seeking relief, inasmuch as there is no indication that the acts were undertaken with the intent
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ever, it seems odd that pure minority courts would characterize the
minority's expectation of continued employment or management participation as a "reasonable" expectation. Nevertheless, such a characterization makes sense given that pure minority courts appear to
define "reasonable" expectations in an expansive manner. So long as
there is evidence that all of the investors shared a basic understanding of employment or participation at the inception of the venture,
pure minority courts seem to protect that understanding as a reasonable expectation! regardless of the circumstances that arise after the
business commences (e.g., subsequent misconduct or incompetence by
the minority shareholder). 3

of forcing an involuntary dissolution of the corporation" (emphasis added)); In re Burack, 524
N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (App. Div. 1988) (responding to an assertion that a minority shareholder's
termination "was provoked by his own bad acts" by noting the following- "[The doctrine of
'unclean hands' is not an automatic bar to relief .... Only when a minority shareholder whose
own acts, made in bad faith and undertaken with a view toward forcing an involuntary dissolution, give rise to the complaint of oppression should relief be barred. On the record before us, we
cannot conclude that [the terminated shareholder's] actions were undertaken with this specific
view in mind." (citations omitted)).
92. Indeed, courts have noted that a reasonable expectation is one that is understood by all
of the shareholders at the inception of the venture. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
93. For example, the Topper court's language suggests that it was satisfied that Topper's
expectation of active participation in the business was understood by all of the shareholders at
the inception of the venture. See, e.g., Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361 ('The petitions and the
supporting affidavits in this case show conclusively, and respondents do not deny, that petitioner
Topper associated himself with [the controlling shareholders] ... in the expectation of being an
active participant in the operation of both corporations." (emphasis added)); id. at 362 ('CThe
Court finds that the undisputed understanding of the parties was such at the time of the formation of the corporations that the respondents' actions have severely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations .... '). Once this mutual understanding was proven, the court considered
Topper's expectation of active participation to be "reasonable" and enforceable regardless of any
subsequent circumstances that may have justified the controlling shareholders' actions.
There is, however, another possible interpretation. Perhaps the Topper and Balvik courts
simply concluded that the majority's justification for its actions was pretextual, or perhaps they
believed that the minority shareholder had acted "badly," but not badly enough to deem the
expectation of continued employment and management participation "unreasonable." This
interpretation, of course, suggests that the Topper and Balvik courts did consider the majority's
justification as part of their reasonable expectations inquiry. If true, two implications arise.
First, the "irrelevance" language should be limited to the particular facts of those cases rather
than understood as a broader proposition. See Hillman, supra note 27, at 51 n.161 (suggesting
that Topper may be "insignificant as a matter of preceden"). Second, Topper and Balvik should
not be viewed as reflecting a pure minority perspective. Instead, it may be more appropriate to
view the pure minority perspective as an analytical construct rather than as an actual position
in the case law. It should be noted, however, that both courts suggest in no uncertain terms that
the majority's justification-whether credible or not-is irrelevant to the oppression analysis. See
supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Asserting that Topper and Balvik represent a pure
minority perspective, therefore, seems both plausible and fair.
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C. Analyzing Shareholder Oppressionfrom Pure Perspectives
The stark contrast between the pure majority and pure minority perspectives produces different outcomes in a number of factual
scenarios. Indeed, because the pure formulations take diametrical
positions on the relevance of the majority's justification, different
results are reached whenever the majority shareholder has a legitimate business purpose for her actions. For example, when minority
fault94 is present, the pure majority perspective is unlikely to find
oppression liability. As the Priebe decision indicates, when the minority shareholder's misconduct or incompetence is harming the corporation, efforts to eliminate that harm (e.g., terminating the minority
shareholder's employment) are surely serving a legitimate business
purpose. 5 From a pure minority perspective of oppression, however,
the fact that the minority shareholder's fault brings about the allegedly oppressive act is unimportant. As Topper and Balvik illustrate,'
the focus of a pure minority perspective is the absolute protection of
the minority's interests. The minority's fault and the majority's corresponding justification for its actions are simply irrelevant to the oppression analysis. 7 Thus, in this "minority fault" context, the choice of
perspective will make an outcome-determinative difference.

94. See supranote 32 (defining "minority fault").
95. See supratext accompanying notes 2-6 (discussing Priebe);see, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1976) (granting oppression-based relief to a
minority shareholder who was discharged from employment and removed from the board of
directors, and noting that "[t]here was no showing of misconduct on Wilkes's part as a director,
officer or employee of the corporation which would lead us to approve the majority action as a
legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an undesirable individual bent on injuring or
destroying the corporation); see also Connolly v. Bain, 484 N.W.2d 207, 210-11 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992) (concluding that a minority shareholder's lack of salaried employment in a close corporation did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, in part because the minority's "conduct and
demeanor justified [the controlling group] not to employ [him] . . . [The minority shareholder]
was a recalcitrant shareholder who repeatedly threatened to develop the product on his own. He
devoted less time developing the product than [the controlling group]"); Harris v. Mardan Bus.
Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that the discharge of a minority shareholder for performance deficiencies was justified by a legitimate business purpose and
was not oppressive); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 390, 396 (Or. 1973)
(noting that the majority shareholder discharged the minority shareholder from employment
purportedly because the minority shareholder 'had made no sales" and "was not doing the
company any good," and suggesting that the termination was not oppressive because the minority shareholder "apparently contributed little, if anything, to [the company's] successful operation"); Thompson, supra note 37, at 220 ('The decisions reflect a lessening of judicial willingness
to provide relief as the minority shareholder's conduct becomes more objectionable.").
96. See supratext accompanying notes 84-89 (discussing Topper); supratext accompanying
notes 7-10 (discussing Balvik).
97. See, e.g., Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362; Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D.
1987).
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The majority shareholder may also have a legitimate business
justification for her actions that is unrelated to the minority's fault.
For example, poor business or economic conditions, the advent of new
technology, or the elimination of a line of business may all constitute a
legitimate business reason that, from a pure majority perspective,
justifies the termination of a minority shareholder's employment. 8
From a pure minority perspective, of course, the justifications are
irrelevant. If the termination has frustrated the minority's reasonable
expectation of continued employment, oppression liability will arise.
As a consequence, when both majority fault 99 and minority fault"°° are
absent, a court's choice between pure majority and pure minority
perspectives will often determine whether relief is granted.'
Despite the implication of the "not contradictory" and "little difference" characterizations, 2 therefore, majority and minority perspectives are far from similar when their pure formulations are
considered. Given the extremity of difference between the pure majority and the pure minority perspectives, the choice between the two
positions will very often have an outcome-determinative impact. The
98. See Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a Considerationof Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose, 97 DICK. L. REV. 227,
254 (1993) (discussing a minority shareholder's termination resulting from the discontinuance of
a line of business); see also infra note 154.
99. See supra note 31 (defining "majority fault").
100. See supranote 32 (defining "minority fault").
101. Some statutory schemes support the proposition that pure perspectives will reach different outcomes in a "no fault" scenario. Statutory provisions in California and North Carolina,
for example, have been referred to as "no-fault" dissolution statutes because they are structured
to provide relief to the minority shareholder even if the majority's conduct is blameless. See, e.g.,
Thompson, supranote 37, at 210 (citing California and North Carolina as "states [that] explicitly
contain 'no fault' grounds for dissolution in their statutes"). See generally Hillman, supra note
27, at 55-60 (describing the California and North Carolina statutes). Indeed, both statutes allow
dissolution or other remedies whenever "reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or
interests of the complaining shareholder." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1995); accord
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2) (1999); see Hillman, supra note 27, at 56 & n.185. Based on this
language, commentators have noted that "[t]he question of motivation or fault has no role under
the rights or interests inquiry," and that "this feature . . . makes the California and North
Carolina statutes promising sources of relief for dissatisfied minority shareholders." Id. at 59-60;
see also Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close CorporationAct and a Proposed
Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 823 n.31 (1985) (noting that "[t]he focus [of the North
Carolina statute] is to be on fairness to the plaintiff and not on the defendant's behavior");
Hillman, supranote 27, at 56-57 ("[The fact that the ground for relief has not been stated with
reference to the misconduct of the controlling shareholders removes significant obstacles .... !).
Because the statutes are "tilted" to providing relief to minority shareholders even when majority
fault is absent, these provisions reflect a minority approach and exemplify the distinction
between the perspectives. It should be noted, however, that the North Carolina courts have
refused to grant relief under their statute unless there is proof that the frustrated expectation
"was without fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control." Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 564 (N.C. 1983).
102. See supratext accompanying notes 14-19.
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"modified" formulations of the perspectives, however, represent middle
ground approaches that are more similar in operation. Seeing the
differences between the formulations, therefore, is more difficult. As a
consequence, the modified perspectives will be examined in greater
detail and with a greater analysis of the potential factual scenarios.
IV. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE 'MODIFIED" PERSPECTIVES OF
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION

Some courts have been troubled by the practical implications of
adopting "pure" perspectives. For example, even courts that favor a
minority-centered perspective are often uncomfortable granting relief
when the minority shareholder's own misconduct or incompetence has
brought about the allegedly oppressive act. In these circumstances,
even minority-perspective courts favor the majority's discretion to
take action. Similarly, some majority-centered courts are reluctant to
ignore minority interests in their oppression analyses. These majoritycentered courts recognize, at least to some extent, that the minority's
position in the close corporation is precarious and is deserving of consideration. Thus, some courts have suggested middle ground, or "modified," majority and minority perspectives of oppression that are less
absolute than their respective "pure" formulations.
A. The Modified Majority Perspective
The modified majority perspective of oppression still concerns
itself with the propriety of the majority's conduct and the existence of
a legitimate business purpose. Unlike the pure majority perspective,
however, the modified majority perspective also incorporates minority
interests into its oppression analysis. For example, in Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., the court echoed a pure majority
perspective of oppression by explaining that the majority could defend
against an oppression lawsuit by "demonstrat[ing] a legitimate business purpose for its action."'' Significantly, however, the court went
on to state the following:
When an asserted business purpose for their action is advanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less
harmful to the minority's interest. If called on to settle a dispute, our courts must

103. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
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weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.'O°

Despite the apparent significance of this "less harmful alternative" language, there has been little discussion of it by courts and
commentators." Undeniably, however, the inclusion of this language
injects a consideration of minority interests into the majority perspective's oppression inquiry. As the modified majority perspective begins
to incorporate minority concerns, of course, the gap between the perspectives begins to narrow.
As mentioned, however, a minority perspective is concerned
primarily with the minority's interests."° It is unclear whether the
courts will extend the "less harmful alternative" language that far.
Indeed, although the less harmful alternative language incorporates
minority interests into the majority perspective's oppression inquiry,
those interests may still be secondary to concerns about corporate
welfare. As long as the modified majority perspective remains primarily concerned with the corporation's interests, such an inquiry will
remain distinguishable from the minority perspective.
Put differently, the extent to which the modified majority approach narrows the gap between the majority and minority perspectives depends upon what the courts will consider a less harmful
alternative. If any alternative course of action less harmful to the
minority's interests qualifies, regardless of whether the alternative is
equally feasible and cost-effective to the corporation, then it is fair to
assert that safeguarding minority shareholders is the primary concern
of the modified majority perspective. On the other hand, if a less
harmful alternative to the majority's conduct must be equally feasible
and cost-effective to the corporation,' then protecting the majority's

104. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 516 A.2d
132, 136 (Vt. 1986); see, e.g., Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366 (Mont.
1990) ("[Ihe controlling group should not be stymied by a minority stockholder's grievances if
the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose and the minority stockholder cannotdemonstrate a less harmful alternative."(emphasis added)).
105. Even the Wilkes court provided no discussion or analysis of its "less harmful alternative"
restriction. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64; see also Peeples, supra note 69, at 500 ('The
Wilkes court, however, did not have to demonstrate the operation of the less harmful means
approach. Instead, the court simply acknowledged, without elaboration, that comparisons will be
necessary.').
106. See supra text accompanying note 72.
107. Cf. Davey v. City of Omaha, 107 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting, in a Title VII disparate impact analysis, that "[e]ven if the employer can demonstrate a valid business justification, the plaintiff still has the opportunity to persuade the fact finder that alternative practices
would have equally satisfied the employer's interests without creating a disparate impact," and
stating that "[uin determining whether proffered alternatives are equally effective, the fact finder
may consider factors such as efficiency, cost, or other burdens associated with the alternative).
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discretion to act in the corporation's interest constitutes the focus of
the modified majority perspective.
To flesh out these considerations, assume that a close corporation minority shareholder claims that the majority shareholder's re0 8 The
fusal to declare dividends constitutes oppressive conduct."
majority shareholder defends by asserting and proving an immediate
need to retain profits for the replacement of outdated equipment. In
response, the minority shareholder demonstrates that the corporation
can borrow funds to satisfy its equipment replacement objective. The
minority asserts that borrowing money for the replacement is an
alternative course of action less harmful to its interests, as the retained profits can then be used for the payment of dividends. Assume,
however, that borrowing money for the equipment replacement is
more expensive for the company than using retained earnings."
Replacing outdated equipment typically serves the corporation's interests. As a consequence, the need for replacement is likely to
suffice as a legitimate business purpose for the refusal to declare
dividends.' From a minority perspective, however, the lack of dividend payments may very well violate the minority's reasonable expectations depending on the understandings of the parties and the
amount of time since dividends were last paid."' Absent considerations
of a less harmful alternative, therefore, majority and minority perspectives could reach different liability outcomes on these facts.
But what of the minority's proposed alternative of borrowing
the needed funds? Such a suggestion appears to constitute a Wilkeslike less harmful alternative given that it accomplishes the business
objective of funding equipment replacement while inflicting less harm
upon the minority shareholder (i.e., retained earnings are freed up for
dividends). Compared to the majority's proposed action, however, the
minority's borrowing alternative is more expensive for the corporation
(i.e., borrowing is costlier than using retained funds). The less harmful

108. See supra text accompanying note 43 (noting that the refusal to declare dividends is a
common freeze-out technique).
109. Professor Peeples sets forth a near-identical hypothetical in commenting on the Wilkes
framework. See Peeples, supranote 69, at 500.
110. See supranote 64 and accompanying text (noting that a legitimate business purpose is
typically linked to a legitimate corporate purpose).
111. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020-22 (Sup. Ct. 1984); see also Moll, supra note 29, at 553 (stating that every
close corporation shareholder has a "general" reasonable expectation "that her commitment of
capital entitles her to a proportionate share of the corporate earnings); cf. Patton v. Nicholas,
279 S.W.2d 848, 854 (Tex. 1955) (noting that "the malicious suppression of dividends is a wrong
akin to breach of trust... for which the courts will afford a remedy).
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alternative language does not necessarily indicate, however, that
economic equivalence to the corporation has any relevance to the
analysis.' Literally construed, the alternative course of action must
only (1) accomplish the business objective, and (2) harm the minority
less than the majority's actions."3 The effect on the corporation is
arguably irrelevant so long as the majority's business objective is
accomplished."" Conversely, of course, the fact that the minority's
proposal creates a greater corporate expense than the majority's conduct may convince a court to reject the alternative."' Because courts
have yet to flesh out these issues, these possibilities are all plausible
outcomes.
In short, if economic or other equivalence to the corporation is
not a prerequisite of a less harmful alternative, the modified majority
perspective shifts the primary focus of the legitimate business purpose
inquiry to protection of the minority's interests. In so doing, of course,
the oppression analysis of the modified majority perspective functions
similarly, if not identically, to the oppression analysis of the minority
perspective. If equivalence to the corporation is required, however,
corporate benefit continues as the emphasis of the modified majority
perspective, and the gap between majority and minority perspectives
remains."'
B. The Modified Minority Perspective
The modified minority perspective of oppression still focuses on
protecting the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations. In
contrast to the pure minority perspective, however, the modified minority perspective is more contextualized, as it only protects expectations that are reasonable in the particular circumstances before the
court. As a consequence, and again in contrast to its pure formulation,

112. See Mitchell, supra note 71, at 1709 (noting that the Wilkes less harmful alternative
restriction "could exact a price in efficiency by requiring controlling interests to structure
transactions in a more expensive manner to avoid harm to the minority'); Peeples, supranote 69,
at 507 ("Questions remain, however, about the guidelines for the court's balancing of the interests of the shareholder and the corporation. The balance requires a tradeoff between economic
benefit to the corporation and protection of minority interests." (footnote omitted)).
113. See supratext accompanying note 104.
114. See supra note 112; cf. Mitchell, supra note 71, at 1712 n.152 ('The absence of less
harmful corporatemeans to achieve the goal of terminating Wilkes does not mitigate the harm to
him as a shareholder.").
115. Cf. 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supranote 14, § 3:05, at 28 ("Conceivably, a court might order payment of a dividend in spite of a need for more capital and thus compel management to
raise funds from other sources; but this would, indeed; be unlikely.').
116. This construction of the less harmful alternative language is more likely. See infra text
accompanying notes 234-41.
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the modified minority perspective is willing to consider the propriety
and justifiability of the majority's conduct to the extent that the majority's proffered justification sheds light on whether the minority's
expectation was reasonable in the circumstances at issue. " For example, if the majority shareholder proves that the minority shareholder
was discharged for misconduct, that justification has great relevance
to the reasonableness of the minority's expectation of continued employment. Can a shareholder, in other words, have a "reasonable"
expectation of continued employment when his conduct is improper?
As mentioned, from a pure minority perspective, the answer appears
to be yes. Indeed, if pure minority courts mean what they say, reasonable expectations are defined expansively to refer to basic understandings shared by the investors at the venture's inception."'
Subsequent circumstances arising after the commencement of the
business, such as minority shareholder misconduct, are purportedly
not considered by pure minority courts. 19
From a modified minority perspective,' however, the answer is
likely no, as a court will consider the subsequent circumstances that
arise (e.g., misconduct) before deeming an expectation "reasonable." A
modified minority court, in other words, goes one step further in its
analysis than a pure minority court. A protected "reasonable expectation" does not arise until (1) the court is satisfied that all of the investors shared a basic understanding (e.g., employment, management
participation) at the venture's inception, and (2) the court is satisfied
that all of the investors intended that basic understanding to persist
in the post-inception circumstances that arise.' Whereas a pure minority court recognizes an enforceable "reasonable expectation" after
the first step of the analysis,' a modified minority court recognizes an

117. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 572 (N.C. 1983) (Martin, J., concurring) ('The reasons why the complaining shareholder's interests require protection is highly
relevant in the resolution of the case.').
118. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
119. See supranotes 90-91 and accompanying text.
120. See Hillman, supra note 27, at 54 (noting that Topper, a pure minority court, differs
from Exadaktilos, a modified minority court, "only in its analysis of the reasonableness of the
expectations," and making the following observation: "In Topper, the court assumed that it was
reasonable to have an absolute expectation of continued employment, while in Exadaktilos the
court assumed that it was reasonable to expect continued employment only so long as the
services were performed in a competent fashion and contributions were being made to the
enterprise."); see also supra text accompanying notes 84-89 (discussing Topper); infra text
accompanying notes 137-39 (discussing Exadaktilos).
121. See supratext accompanying notes 92-93.
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enforceable "reasonable expectation" only after both steps have been
accomplished.'
The difficulty of the modified minority perspective is the second
step-i.e., determining whether a basic understanding of employment
or management participation at the venture's inception was intended
to persist in the circumstances pending before the court. At the first
step in the analysis, there is often circumstantial evidence proving the
existence of a basic understanding-an understanding shared by all of
the participants at the outset of the business-that investment in the
company entitled a shareholder to employment and to a management
role in the venture.' At the second step, however, there is generally
no evidence indicating whether this basic understanding was intended
to continue in particular circumstances that may subsequently arise
(e.g., employee misconduct, deteriorating business conditions). Nevertheless, if modified minority courts construe this second step too narrowly-thereby construing "reasonable expectations" too narrowlyminority shareholder protections are substantially eroded. For
example, if a basic understanding continues in the circumstances only
where the majority lacks a legitimate business purpose for its actions,
then a modified minority court effectively recognizes a "reasonable
expectation" only where a legitimate business purpose is absent.
Under such a construction, there is no difference between the majority
and minority perspectives of oppression. As of yet, however, modified
minority courts have not construed the second step in such a narrow
fashion. Indeed, courts have refused to protect the minority's interests
only where minority shareholder misconduct or incompetence is
present." To this extent, of course, modified minority courts have
considered the propriety and justifiability of the majority's conduct.
Just as the modified majority perspective incorporates minority
concerns into its oppression analysis, so too does the modified minority
perspective factor majority prerogatives, at least to some extent, into
its oppression inquiry.

122. See infra Part V.E. (discussing the proper operation of the modified minority perspective).
123. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), affld, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1984); see also infra notes 137-39, 141 and accompanying text
(discussing Exadaktilos and Gimpeo.
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C. Analyzing ShareholderOppressionfrom Modified Perspectives
1. Majority Fault Present/Minority Fault Absent
The basic freeze-out scenario provides a nice launching point
for considering the differences between the modified majority and
modified minority perspectives. When the majority has no legitimate
business purpose for its actions (i.e., majority fault is present), and
when the allegedly oppressive behavior is brought about through no
misconduct or incompetence of the minority (i.e., minority fault is
absent), it is likely that a conventional freeze-out is at issue. In this
context, there is no substantive distinction between the modified
perspectives, as both approaches would conclude that oppression
liability has arisen. For example, if a minority shareholder was unjustifiably discharged from employment, removed from management, and
cut off from dividends, a modified majority court (as well as a pure
majority court) would find liability due to the majority's lack of a
legitimate business purpose for its actions. 5 The less harmful alternative inquiry would not even be reached.' Similarly, in the absence of
minority misconduct or incompetence, a modified minority court would
likely find that the minority's expectations of a job, a management
position, and a proportionate share of the corporate earnings are all
"reasonable" in the circumstances and are deserving of protection.'27
Thus, in the conventional freeze-out context involving only majority
fault, the choice between modified perspectives makes no substantive
difference.' In this setting, therefore, it is accurate to describe the

125. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1986); Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass. 1976); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d
1033, 1034 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). As the Wilkes court noted:
[1]t is apparent that the majority stockholders... have not shown a legitimate business
purpose for severing Wilkes from the payroll of the corporation or for refusing to reelect
him as a salaried officer and director ... There was no showing of misconduct on
Wilkes's part as a director, officer or employee of the corporation which would lead us to
approve the majority action as a legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an undesirable individual bent on injuring or destroying the corporation.... It is an inescapable
conclusion from all the evidence that the action of the majority stockholders here was a
designed "freeze out' for which no legitimate business purpose has been suggested.
Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64.
126. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-65.
127. See, e.g., In re Burack, 524 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459-60 (App. Div. 1988); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903-04 (App. Div. 1985); In re Taines, 444 N.Y.S.2d
540, 543-44 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
A pure minority court would reach the same result, although the absence of minority misconduct or incompetence would not be a relevant factor in the court's analysis. See supra text
accompanying notes 90-91.
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perspectives as "not contradictory" and having "little difference" in
practice.
2. Majority Fault Absent/Minority Fault Present
When the pure perspectives were applied to this "minority
fault' scenario, different results were reached.' Under modified perspectives of oppression, however, this difference in result is not likely
to persist. Nevertheless, because of the uncertainty surrounding the
less harmful alternative restriction, there is some possibility of a
continuing distinction.
From a modified majority perspective, the presence of minority
fault continues to be a critical factor in the oppression analysis, as
such fault provides a legitimate business justification for the majority's actions."' A modified majority court, however, would also consider
the minority's interests as part of its less harmful alternative inquiry.
Thus, the interpretive problems of the '"ess harmful alternative"
language return. For example, assume that a close corporation minority shareholder lacks the skills necessary for his employment
position."' The majority discharges the shareholder for incompetence
and asserts this "minority fault!' as a legitimate business justification
for the discharge.'32 Rather than outright termination, however, the
minority shareholder proposes that his interests would suffer less
harm if the company paid for the training needed to make the minority competent in his position."n Such a proposal accomplishes the
majority's legitimate objective of having a competent and productive
workforce, and it allows the minority to retain his employment. To be
sure, however, training the shareholder is costly to the corporation.
Moreover, operating the business on a short-handed basis during the

128. Even if the majority's actions do not result in a complete freeze-out, unjustified majority
conduct will likely trigger oppression liability under both modified majority and modified minority perspectives. For example, if the majority terminated the minority without a legitimate
business purpose, but still provided adequate dividends, the perspectives would likely reach the
same result. A modified majority court would find oppression liability due to the unjustified
termination, and a modified minority court would find oppression liability due to the likely
frustration of the minority's reasonable expectation of employment.
129. See supranotes 94-97 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
131. Assume further that the shareholder possessed no additional skills that could be profitably used by the corporation.
132. See supranotes 95, 130 and accompanying text.
133. In an attempt to make the alternative more palatable, assume that the minority shareholder additionally proposes a reduction or suspension of his salary during the training period.
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training period may be less feasible than hiring an immediate replacement. If the less harmful alternative analysis ignores the effects
on the corporation, however, terminating the incompetent minority
shareholder may give rise to oppression liability. Although such an
outcome seems bizarre, it stems directly from the possibility that a
less harmful alternative inquiry will not require economic or other
equivalence to the corporation."u Thus, although it is likely that a
modified majority court would reject oppression liability in situations
of minority fault, the puzzle of the less harmful alternative suggests at
least the possibility that liability will be found.
From a modified minority perspective, the presence of minority
misconduct or incompetence is also an important component of the
oppression analysis. As mentioned, a modified minority court looks to
the majority's proffered justification as part of its assessment of the
"reasonableness" of the expectation in the circumstances at issue."' 5
When the minority shareholder is guilty of misconduct or incompetence, modified minority courts have effectively held that expectations
of continued employment and management participation are unreasonable and unworthy of protection. 36' For example, in Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., a minority shareholder brought an oppression claim after being terminated from his close corporation position. 37
The court stated that the plaintiffs discharge "was because of his
unsatisfactory performance," as the evidence demonstrated "that
plaintiff failed to get along with employees, causing the loss of key
personnel, that he quit on more than one occasion, without reason or
notice, and that he was not compatible with the other principals.' ' As
the Exadaktiloscourt concluded:
The circumstances under which the parties' expectations in these areas were disappointed do not establish oppressive action toward plaintiff by the controlling shareholders. The promise of employment was honored, the opportunity being lost to
plaintiff through no fault of defendants. The parties' expectation that plaintiff would at
some time participate in management was likewise thwarted by plaintiffs failure to
3 9
satisfy the condition precedent to participation, [i].e., that he learn the business."

As Exadaktilos indicates, the minority shareholder's expectation of
continued employment was unreasonable from a modified minority

134. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
135. See supra text accompanying note 117.
136. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
137. See Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 556, 561-62.
138. Id. at 561.
139. Id. at 561-62.
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perspective because of his "blameworthy" conduct.' ° Exadaktilos suggests, therefore, that the distinctions between the modified perspectives are likely more form than substance when only minority fault is
involved."' Because of interpretive questions surrounding the less
harmful alternative language,"' however, the perspectives may very
well reach different results in this scenario.
3. Majority Fault Present/Minority Fault Present
Interesting issues are raised when the modified perspectives of
oppression are applied to a factual situation involving both majority
and minority fault. Assume, for example, that a majority shareholder

140. See Hillman, supra note 27, at 54 ("Arguably, Exadaktilos differs from Topper only in its
analysis of the reasonableness of the expectations."); id. at 53 ('The point of distinction between
Topper and Exadaktilos is that the court in the latter case also considered the propriety of the
actions by the controlling shareholders .... ."); see also supra note 120.
141. The decision of Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1984), further illustrates
the likely lack of substantive distinction between the modified perspectives when only minority
fault is involved. In Gimpel, Robert Gimpel was a minority shareholder who stole from the
business and was eventually discharged from employment. See id. at 1017. Claiming that the
majority had engaged in oppressive conduct towards him, Gimpel filed a petition to dissolve the
corporation. See id. at 1017-18. In assessing whether the majority's conduct could be considered
oppressive, the Gimpel court noted the "burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct" definitionan approach that reflects a majority perspective-as well as the "reasonable expectations" definition-an approach that reflects a minority perspective. See id. at 1018-19; supra text accompanying notes 62, 69. Significantly, the court observed that Gimpel's exclusion from active
corporate participation did not merit relief under either definition of oppression. Under the
"wrongful conduct" definition, the court stated the following.
[Gimpel's] discharge, as well as his subsequent exclusion from corporate management,
were not oppressive. It was clearly not wrongful for the corporate victim of a theft to exclude the thief from the councils of power. The salient point here ... is that the petitioner himself was the initial wrongdoer. Thus, the only forms of participation which
may fairly be said to be open to [Gimpel] are those open to a shareholder in the position of
a stranger: possible entitlement to dividends, voting at shareholders' meetings, and access to corporate records.
Id. at 1020 (footnote omitted). Moreover, from a reasonable expectations standpoint, the court
came to the same conclusion:
Mt must be recognized that "reasonable expectations" do not run only one way. To the
extent that [Gimpel] may have entertained "reasonable expectations" of profit ... the
other shareholders also entertained "reasonable expectations" of fidelity and honesty
from him. All such expectations were shattered when [Gimpel] stole from the corporation. His own act broke all bargains. Since then, the only expectations he could reasonably entertain were those of a discovered thiefi ostracism and prosecution .... [Gimpel]
may not lay claim to the reasonable expectation of any specific benefits ....
Id. at 1019-20 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Although Gimpel does not incorporate a less harmful alternative analysis into its oppression
inquiry, the court's reasoning reflects the underlying themes of the modified perspectives.
Gimpel's exclusion was "proper" from a modified majority perspective because his continued
presence was a threat to the corporation's well-being. Similarly, Gimpers expectation of continued participation was unreasonable from a modified minority perspective given the circumstances of his misconduct.
142. See supranotes 106-15 and accompanying text.
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terminates a minority shareholder's employment in part because the
minority's work was inadequate and in part because the majority
wanted to capture the minority's investment and exclude him from
corporate returns. In other words, assume the existence of evidence
indicating that the majority had a mixed motive for terminating the
minority shareholder-a motive that was partially proper (termination for poor performance) and partially improper (termination for
freeze-out purposes).'
A modified majority court is unlikely to find oppression liability
in this mixed motive situation. Indeed, a modified majority court (as
well as a pure majority court) would likely bless conduct motivated by
at least one legitimate business purpose.' Because there is evidence
that the minority shareholder's termination was prompted, at least in
part, by the minority's inadequate employment performance, "a7 legitimate business purpose has been shown, even if there are additional reasons that motivated the termination.'" It should be noted,
however, that a court may cast this issue in causation terms. The
majority shareholder may have to prove that even if freeze-out considerations were absent, the decision to terminate would still have been
made due to the minority's incompetence.' A modified majority court
would, of course, also pursue a less harmful alternative inquiry. With

143. At trial, of course, establishing a "true" mixed motive may be difficult. For example, the
decision-maker may find that the majority's proof of minority fault is not credible. If the majority's proffered justification is rejected, the fact pattern becomes a relatively straightforward
freeze-out scenario (i.e., majority fault present/minority fault absent). See, e.g., O'Donnel v.
Marine Repair Servs., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1199, 1205-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Zimmerman v. Bogoff,
524 N.E.2d 849, 854 (Mass. 1988). Similarly, if the decision-maker credits the majority's assertion of minority fault, any contrary evidence suggesting that the majority was motivated by
improper freeze-out concerns may be downplayed or discredited. The fact pattern would then
resemble a majority fault absent/minority fault present scenario. See, e.g., Michaud v. Morris,
603 So. 2d 886, 888-89 (Ala. 1992).
144. See James D. Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
615, 635 (1997) (noting that "a business purpose inquiry searches for any one of many possible
justifications for a transaction"); Mitchell, supra note 71, at 1708 n.142 (discussing the Wilkes
approach and stating that "the proof that the fiduciary must offer is not of selfless devotion, or
even fairness, but simply of a business purpose, which should generally be easy to establish").
145. Cf. Ueltzhoffer v. Fox Fire Dev. Co., Nos. 9871, 9900, 1991 WL 271584, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd sub nom. Fox Fire Dev. Co. v. Hans, 618 A.2d 90 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) ('I
am not prepared to conclude that the [controlling shareholders] terminated (the minority
shareholder] for the sole and improper purpose of freezing him out of the corporate entities."
(emphasis added)); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 650 (Tenn. 1997) ("If [the controlling
shareholders] were protecting legitimate interests of the corporation, the presence of spite or ill
will would not render them or the corporation liable.").
146. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977) (discussing a "test of causation" in a mixed motive case where the defendant has to show "that it would
have reached the same decision" even in the absence of an impermissible motive).
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the presence of minority incompetence, however, a realistic alternative
short of termination seems unlikely."7
Similarly, because of the presence of minority incompetence, a
modified minority court would likely find that the minority's expectation of continued employment was unreasonable in the circumstances.
Put differently, it is not reasonable for the shareholder to expect that
her employment status is secure when the circumstances indicate that
her job performance is inadequate.' 8 Under this reasoning, a modified
minority court would not find that the termination was oppressive.
To the extent that a modified minority court considers the majority's justification in its oppression analysis, however, a court may be
troubled by the presence of improper freeze-out considerations. Although it is unlikely, a court may enforce an expectation that a termination will be based solely, or at least predominately, on the presence
of the minority's incompetence." 9 If a termination is partially or predominately motivated by illegitimate freeze-out considerations, a
modified minority court may factor that into its balancing of majority
and minority interests and correspondingly lean towards providing
relief. Most likely, however, both modified majority and modified
minority courts would refuse to characterize the termination as oppressive in this mixed motive scenario. Nevertheless, because the
presence of freeze-out considerations raises judicial suspicion, there is
some possibility that outcome distinctions will remain."
4. Majority Fault Absent/Minority Fault Absent
The absence of both majority and minority fault provides perhaps the purest context in which to measure whether meaningful
distinctions exist between the perspectives. When the majority has a

147. As mentioned, a very pro-minority construction of the "less harmful alternative" language is theoretically possible. Such a construction might require the majority to offer rehabilitation opportunities before terminating the shareholder. See supra text accompanying notes
131-34.
148. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
149. Cf. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 (Utah 1982) (noting that an
interference with contract claim can be established by proof of "improper purpose," and stating
that "[tihe alternative of improper purpose will be satisfied where it can be shown that the
actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff' (emphasis added)). Under this limitation, the majority could evade oppression liability-even if the termination was motivated by
improper freeze-out considerations-as long as the discharge was predominantly motivated by
the unsatisfactory performance of the minority shareholder.
150. The court may believe, for example, that the existence of freeze-out considerations
makes it more likely that the majority shareholder will couple the termination with additional
freeze-out measures, such as the denial of dividends. Due to these concerns, a modified minority
court may choose to grant some relief.
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legitimate business purpose for its actions and the minority has not
been guilty of misconduct or incompetence, the question of liability
will turn on the oppression perspective utilized by the decision-maker.
A simple hypothetical supports this proposition. Assume that a minority shareholder performs his employment tasks for a close corporation in a superior fashion. Due to technological advances, however, the
minority shareholder's tasks can now be performed entirely by machine. Despite the superior performance of the minority shareholder,
assume that it is indisputable that the machine will result in greater
productivity and diminished costs. In these circumstances, would
terminating the employment of the minority shareholder result in
oppression liability?
From a modified majority perspective, the productivity gains
and cost savings clearly benefit the corporation and suffice as a legitimate business purpose for the termination. Moreover, assuming
that the machine operates at productivity levels beyond human capacities, skills training or other pro-minority less harmful alternatives

are unlikely.51'
From a modified minority perspective, however, the termination of the minority shareholder is problematic. As mentioned, a modified minority court will consider the majority's justification in its effort
to protect reasonable expectations in the circumstances. 5 ' In this
context, therefore, modified minority courts must ask whether it is
reasonable for a minority shareholder to expect continued employment
when a technological advance can perform the shareholder's job in a
more efficient and less expensive manner. Most likely, of course, the
shareholders did not discuss this possibility at the time they decided
to commit capital to the business. It is tempting, therefore, to fall back
on a default presumption that a reasonable expectation exists only
when the majority shareholder lacks a legitimate business purpose for
his actions. As mentioned, however, modified minority courts have not
yet gone this far. The modified minority precedents seem to deny
protection to established expectations of employment only where

151. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34. The ultimate pro-minority less harmful alternative, of course, involves compelling the majority shareholder to retain the minority shareholder in his salaried position, even though the machine will now be performing the minority's
usual job tasks. Obviously, such a measure requires the corporation to pay an unnecessary
salary to an employee whose services are no longer needed. If corporate expense and practicality
are irrelevant to the less harmful alternative analysis, however, such a result remains within the
realm of possibility.
152. See supranote 117 and accompanying text.
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minority shareholder misconduct or incompetence is present."u To the
extent that the minority shareholder in this hypothetical is performing his employment tasks in a superior and loyal fashion, the minority's continued employment falls outside of the "unprotected"
precedent and may very well constitute an enforceable "reasonable
expectation" in the circumstances."
Some courts may also object to this hypothetical on the grounds
that the majority shareholder is continuing to receive the financial
and nonfinancial benefits of close corporation employment" while the
minority shareholder loses these benefits as a result of the termination. Indeed, a number of courts have suggested that the majority's
retention of disproportionate benefit is the hallmark of shareholder
oppression." It is useful, therefore, to explore an additional hypothetical. Assume that a two-person close corporation is earning $200,000 in
profits and is distributing it equally to the two shareholders as salary
(i.e., $100,000 each). An economic recession dampens consumer
spending such that the corporation is now earning only $100,000 in
profits. To reduce corporate expenses, the majority shareholder terminates her own employment as well as the employment of the minority
shareholder. One professional manager is hired to do the work of both
shareholders at a $100,000 salary. In response, the minority shareholder files a lawsuit asserting that his termination amounts to oppressive conduct.

153. See, e.g., Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 562; Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020
(Sup. Ct. 1984).
154. See Hillman, supra note 27, at 80. As Professor Hillman observed:
The employment expectation may be defeated under circumstances in which the participant is willing and able to perform employment services but is not permitted to do so by
those in control. The reasons for denying employment may range from an attempt to
force the participant to sell his or her interest at a distress price, for which relief based on
the misconduct of those in control may be available, to deteriorating business conditions
or declining needs for particular skills. To the extent that relief is not otherwise available, denial of employment in these circumstances presents the clearest case for relief
under an expectations-based analysis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
155. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975) ('The controlling group may not, consistent with its strict duty to the minority, utilize its control of the
corporation to obtain special advantages and disproportionate benefit from its share ownership.'); Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("Even if
there were sound business reasons for the corporation's actions, it is clear that the ultimate
beneficiary was [the controlling shareholder], not petitioners [minority shareholders]. Accordingly, petitioners adequately demonstrated that they were oppressed.'); Crosby v. Beam, 548
N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) ("Control of the stock in a close corporation cannot be used to give
the majority benefits which are not shared by the minority.').
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The terminations of both the majority and the minority shareholders seem to eliminate any disproportionate benefit problem."7
From a modified majority perspective, the mutual terminations are
likely justified by the business purpose of reducing corporate expenses
to account for the $100,000 decline in corporate profits. Indeed, assume that the majority offers proof that the discharges will save the
corporation $100,000 (i.e., total salary expenses have been reduced
from $200,000 to $100,000) plus sums generated by decreasing the
number of employees from two to one (e.g., lower expenses for office
space, lower expenses for employee health benefits, and lower coordination costs). Absent the less harmful alternative language, therefore,
a modified majority court would likely conclude that no oppressive
conduct has occurred.
From a modified minority perspective, however, the minority
shareholder has lost the value of his close corporation employmentemployment that may have induced his commitment of capital to the
venture in the first place " 8 -through no misconduct or incompetence of
his own. In such circumstances, modified minority courts may be
willing to enforce a reasonable expectation of continued employment
even though the majority shareholder is technically in the same terminated position. Indeed, the court's rationale in In re Imperatore
reflects this possibility."9 In Imperatore, John Imperatore was a
twenty-percent shareholder in a close corporation that operated a
transmission shop. Charles Fox and John Jordan owned the remaining eighty percent of the company's stock." Because the corporation
had allegedly fallen into poor financial condition, Fox and Jordan
discontinued Imperatore's salary. Significantly, however, Fox discon-

157. It may be more accurate to state that the mutual terminations eliminate any "appearance" of disproportionate benefit. It is very likely that the majority shareholder is willing to
terminate herself only because a comparable employment position is available to her, or because
she has another source of income that diminishes her reliance upon salary. Indeed, the majority's own self-interest makes it unlikely that she would orchestrate the loss of her $100,000 close
corporation job unless she had a comparable opportunity with another business or had an
outside source of income. Similarly, the minority shareholder's objection to his termination must
stem from his inability to procure comparable employment and from his dependence on his
salary. This hypothetical likely occurs, therefore, only because an underlying disproportionate
benefit exists. In other words, this hypothetical likely occurs only because the loss of close
corporation employment harms the majority shareholder less than the minority shareholder.
See, e.g., In re Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (App. Div. 1987) (observing that the salaries of
both the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder were discontinued, but noting that
the majority shareholder earned an "independent income" from another business); infra text
accompanying notes 159-63 (discussing Imperatore).
158. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
159. See Imperatore,512 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
160. See id. at 904.
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tinued his own salary as well.16 ' Despite the seemingly equivalent
conduct,' the Imperatore court concluded that the cessation of Imperatore's salary was oppressive and contrary to Imperatore's reasonable expectations:
[Imperatore] clearly agreed to join the venture pursuant to the understanding that he
would be provided with salaried employment as the transmission shop's mechanic, and
he reasonably expected such salaried employment to continue for so long as the corporation existed. While the petitioner could not reasonably complain if his salary were
reduced based upon inadequate performance, in this case his salary was totally eliminated.... The fact that Fox' salary was also terminated does not [aiffect the reasonableness of [Imperatore's] expectation that he would be provided with continuous
salariedemployment duringthe existence of the corporation.'63

As Imperatore illustrates, modified majority and modified minority
courts may reach different results in "no fault' situations even if the
majority and minority shareholders both suffer the same fate."8
When the less harmful alternative language is considered,
however, a modified majority court may also determine that oppression liability is warranted despite the technical absence of disproportionate benefit. Assume, for example, that the minority shareholder
contends that the same legitimate objective of eliminating corporate
expenses could be accomplished by simply reducing the salary paid to
each shareholder to $50,000. The reduction in salary would accomplish the same business objective of saving $100,000 in expenses (i.e.,
total salaries decrease from $200,000 to $100,000), and it would inflict
less harm upon the minority (i.e., the minority retains its employment). Compared to the majority's conduct, however, the corporation
is worse off under the minority's proposal because of the proposal's

161. See id. at 905.
162. The facts of Imperatore indicate that the apparent equivalence in ceasing Fox's and Imperatore's salary was illusory. Indeed, Fox "was apparently the owner with Jordan of another
transmission shop from which he earned an independent income," while Imperatore's salary with
the close corporation was his only source of income. See id. Thus, the loss of salary affected
Imperatore much more than Fox. See supra note 157.
163. Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
164. Imperatore reflects aspects of both pure minority and modified minority approaches.
Indeed, Fox and Jordan maintained that the corporation had fallen into poor financial condition
"largely as a result of the petitioner's ineffective performance in his job as 'technical man.'" Id.
The court reflected a modified minority perspective by observing that Imperatore's salary could
be "reduced based upon inadequate performance." Id. When discussing the complete elimination of Imperatore's salary, however, the court reflected a pure minority perspective by granting
relief and by seemingly ignoring Imperatore's inadequacies. See id. (concluding that Imperatore's reasonable expectation of "continuous salaried employment" was frustrated, and noting
that "[w]hile the petitioner could not reasonably complain if his salary were reduced based upon
inadequate performance, in this case his salary was totally eliminated").
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inability to capture the additional downsizing-related savings." If a
court determines that this worsened corporate position is irrelevant to
the less harmful alternative analysis, the modified majority perspective would also conclude that the termination was oppressive." If the
minority's proposal is rejected because of its relative corporate detriment, however, the differences in outcome between the two perspectives would remain.'67
In short, when the modified perspectives are applied to a "no
fault" scenario, there is a strong possibility that the perspectives will
produce different outcomes. As a consequence, the choice of oppression
perspective is critical.
5. Summary
Although the modified formulations narrow the gap between
the majority and minority perspectives of oppression, the possibility of
differences in outcome remains. Indeed, the language of existing
precedents suggests that courts may draw different conclusions in
particular scenarios depending solely upon the oppression perspective
utilized. Because real and hypothetical cases reveal distinctions between the oppression formulations, moving beyond the "not contradic-

165. As mentioned, decreasing the number of employees from two to one lowers coordination
costs and reduces expenses associated with office space and health benefits. See supra text
accompanying notes 157-58.
166. That is, a modified majority court would conclude that an alternative to mutual terminations existed (i.e., proportionate reductions in salary) that would cause less harm to the
minority shareholder. As a consequence, the majority's decision to terminate would be considered oppressive.
167. Even this conclusion can be questioned. If a less harmful alternative must be economically equivalent, from the corporation's standpoint, to the majority's conduct, a minority shareholder may still prevail in this hypothetical. Indeed, the minority shareholder could propose
several alternative courses of action that would be economically equivalent to the majority's
conduct and that would allow the minority to retain its job. Put differently, the minority could
propose several alternatives that would (1) reduce salary expenses by $100,000; (2) capture
downsizing-related savings; and (3) allow the minority to retain its job. For example, rather
than reducing the salary paid to each shareholder by only $50,000, the minority shareholder
could propose proportionate reductions in salary by an amount equal to the total expenses saved
by the majority's conduct. In other words, rather than reducing total salaries only by $100,000,
the minority could propose reducing total salaries by $100,000 plus the amounts saved from
downsizing (assuming those amounts can be quantified). Similarly, along with proposing a
$50,000 decrease in the salary paid to each shareholder, the minority could offer to forego its
health benefits and, to the extent possible, its office space. Aside from the savings resulting from
decreased coordination costs, this course of action is economically equivalent to the majority's
conduct. Finally, the minority could simply propose that the majority terminate only herself.
Such an action would reduce corporate expenses by $100,000 and would entirely capture the
savings from downsizing. While many of these proposals seem ludicrous, they derive directly
from the less harmful alternative restriction and from the uncertainty generated by the restriction's potential construction.
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tory" and "little difference" perspectives is appropriate. The perspectives should be understood as clearly different approaches to the
shareholder oppression doctrine that can produce divergent results
upon the same set of facts. The remaining question, therefore, is a
significant one-from which perspective should shareholder oppression be viewed?

V. BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND MAJORITY
PREROGATIVES: THE SUPERIORITY OF THE MODIFIED
MINORITY PERSPECTIVE

Understanding the purpose of the shareholder oppression doctrine is critical to an assessment of the different oppression perspectives. After all, without a sense of what the shareholder oppression
doctrine is attempting to accomplish, there is no benchmark for evaluating the operation of the perspectives. This Article maintains that
shareholder oppression should be viewed as a doctrine concerned with
protecting the fair value of a close corporation shareholder's investment. Such a conception, referred to as the "investment moder' of
oppression, " will generally find oppression liability whenever majority conduct harms any component of a minority shareholder's investment. To some extent, however, this investment model of oppression
must yield to a majority prerogative to run the business as it sees fit.
The oppression doctrine, in other words, must attempt to balance both
majority and minority concerns in its operation. Not surprisingly,
striking the appropriate balance between these concerns is a difficult
undertaking. Before exploring this difficulty, however, a basic understanding of the investment model is needed.
A. The Investment Model of Oppression
1. The Absence of a Market
Both courts and commentators have noted that the shareholder
oppression doctrine is best understood by examining the "special nature of close corporations. '69 That "special nature" is linked primarily

168. See generally Moll, supra note 29, at 537-47 (developing the "investment model" of oppression and arguing that shareholder oppression should be viewed as a doctrine that protects
the value of the close corporation shareholder's investment).
169. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that "to a great extent, a
definition of 'oppressive' depends on the special nature of close corporations'); accord 2 O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 9.30, at 142; see also Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d
383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ('The statutory concept of oppressive conduct, and the broad and imprecise

790

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:749

to the lack of a market for close corporation shares."0 Indeed, if the
position of a public corporation shareholder is harmed by the principle
of majority rule, the public shareholder can exit the situation by selling his holdings on the market. Because a "market exit" generally
protects the fair value of a public company investment,1 1 a public
corporation shareholder is adequately safeguarded from oppressive
majority conduct. 72
In the close corporation context, however, there is no market
exit.' 3 Thus, the close corporation shareholder "faces a potential danger that the shareholder of a public corporation generally avoids-the
possibility of harm to the fair value of the shareholder's investment."'""
At its extreme, this harm manifests itself as the classic freeze-out
where the minority shareholder faces a trapped investment"' and an

definitions of the term given by the courts, is best understood by examining the nature and
characteristics of close corporations.').
170. See, e.g., Kleinberger, supra note 33, at 1149 (discussing the lack of a market for close
corporation stock and observing that "[m]ore than any other characteristic, this 'no exit' phenomenon has pushed the law into developing special rules for shareholders in close corporations').
171. See 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 2:15, at 38 (observing that " 'in a publicissue corporation the sensitivity of management to the market price for the stock and the fact
that stock prices are highly responsive to corporate earnings tend to assure the dissatisfied
shareholder of a reasonable price when he liquidates his investment through the market' "
(quoting J.A.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics,Problems,and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 ILL L.F. 1, 21); id. (noting that "in a large public-issue corporation, a shareholder who
is dissatisfied with the way the business is being operated can sell his stock at no great financial

loss').
172. See RMBCA § 14.34 cmt. (1993) ("Shareholders of publicly-traded firms are protected by
their right to sell out if they are dissatisfied with current management or they may seek traditional remedies for breach of fiduciary duty.'); Thompson, supra note 37, at 225 ("Once a corporation's shares are publicly traded, minority shareholders, even if they are also employees, are not
subjected to the risks that are common to the close corporation and which inspired the modern
legislative and judicial remedies.'); id. at 237 (noting that the market offers public corporation
shareholders "protection" and an "exit option).
173. See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
174. Moll, supranote 29, at 543.
175. See, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1027 (N.J. 1993) ("The inability to reflect
dissatisfaction by withdrawing one's investment places the majority shareholder in an enhanccd
power position to use the minority's investment 'without paying for it.' ") (quoting Arthur D.
Spratlin, Jr., Modern Remedies for Oppressionin the Closely Held Corporation,60 MISS. L.J. 405,
405 (1990)); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ('The limited market for stock
in a close corporation and the natural reluctance of potential investors to purchase a noncontrolling interest in a close corporation that has been marked by dissension can result in a
minority shareholder's interest being held 'hostage' by the controlling interest, and can lead to
situations where the majority 'freeze out' minority shareholders by the use of oppressive tactics."); Schlafge, supra note 28, at 1076 ('The terminated minority shareholders' capital is, in
effect, held hostage by those in control of the corporation because there is no marketplace in
which minority shareholders may sell their shares.').
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indefinite exclusion from participation in the business returns.'76 The
position of the close corporation shareholder, therefore, is uniquely
precarious. As one commentator noted, "[i]n no other type of business
arrangement do owners face the possibility of completely losing their
investments by being excluded from employment and denied profits.' 77
"If oppression is to be given meaning in light of the 'special nature' of close corporations, the absence of a market should be viewed
as the primary impetus for the development of the oppression doctrine
in the close corporation setting.'7 8 Protecting the value of the close
corporation shareholder's investment, therefore, should be understood
as the focus of the shareholder oppression doctrine. The doctrine, in
other words, should approximate the role of the market in the public
corporation. Just as the market protects the value of the public corporation shareholder's investment, the oppression doctrine should protect the value of the close corporation shareholder's investment.
2. The Purpose of Involuntary Dissolution Statutes
Along with examining the "special nature" of close corporations, courts have also noted that inquiring into "the Legislature's
general purpose in creating ... involuntary-dissolution statute[s]" is
helpful in giving meaning to the oppression doctrine.7 7 As mentioned,
the dissolution statutes of many states include "oppression!' as a
ground for involuntary dissolution of a corporation." In the leading
New York case of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., the court of appeals
discussed the purpose behind the legislature's inclusion of "oppressive
actions" as an involuntary dissolution ground:
As the stock of closely held corporations generally is not readily salable, a minority
shareholder at odds with management policies may be without either a voice in protecting his or her interests or any reasonable means of withdrawing his or her investment. This predicament may fairly be considered the legislative concern underlying the

176. See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
177. Schlafge, supranote 28, at 1074 n.19; see also Hetherington & Dooley, supranote 1, at 6
("The position of the minority in the close corporation is as unique as it is precarious: no other
form of business organization subjects an owner to the dual hazards of a complete loss of liquidity and an indefinite exclusion from sharing in the profitability of the firm."); cf. 1 O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 7.20, at 90 ("[Ihe lack of a market for the shares of a
close corporation.., leaves a minority shareholder vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the
position of a shareholder in a publicly held corporation.").
178. Moll, supranote 29, at 544; supranote 170.
179. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984); see 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supranote 14, § 9.30, at 141-42 (noting that "most courts have come to recognize
that [oppression and similar terms] can best be construed against the background of the special
nature of close corporations and the legislative purpose in enacting involuntary dissolution
statutes').
180. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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provision at issue in this case; inclusion of the criteria that the corporation's stock not
complaining shareholder be subject to opbe traded on securities markets and that the
8
pressive actions supports this conclusion.' '

The language of the Kemp court strongly suggests that the vulnerability of the close corporation investment was the primary motivation
behind the inclusion of the "oppressive actions" language in the involuntary dissolution statute. The purpose of the statute and the "oppressive actions" ground, therefore, was to provide the shareholder's
investment with some protection in this vulnerable situation." To the
extent that the purpose of the statute gives meaning to the oppression
action, protecting the close corporation shareholder's investment is
central to the operation of the doctrine.
3. The Prevalence of the Buyout Remedy
As mentioned, both legislatures and courts have authorized alternative remedies for oppressive conduct that avoid actual dissolution
of the corporation." The most prevalent alternative remedy is the
buyout of the oppressed investor's holdings." The prevalence of the
buyout remedy in litigated cases supports the investment model's
conception of shareholder oppression as a protector of the close corpoM

181. Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1180 ('The purpose of this
involuntary dissolution statute is to provide protection to the minority shareholder whose
reasonable expectations in undertaking the venture have been frustrated and who has no
adequate means of recovering his or her investment.").
182. Indeed, dissolution aids the oppressed close corporation shareholder to the extent that it
provides a mechanism for recovering the value of the shareholder's investment. The conventional dissolution proceeding determines the value of a business and awards each stockholder its
proportional share of that value. See Murdock, supra note 46, at 447-51 (discussing different
valuation approaches to dissolution and their effect upon the value of the minority shareholder's
interest). A Kemp-like dissolution statute, therefore, is designed to protect the value of a close
corporation shareholder's investment. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(b) (McKinney 1986)
(amended 1998) (stating that a court, 'in determining whether to proceed with involuntary
dissolution ... shall take into account: (1) Whether liquidation of the corporation is the only
feasible means whereby the petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their
investment ... ." (emphasis added)); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 560
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), affld, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) ("[in most
instances the market place provides a remedy for those shareholders who feel that they are being
oppressed by a large corporation, i.e., they can sell their stock. That remedy is not readily
available to minority shareholders in close corporations. The [oppression-based dissolution]
statute was designedtherefore to solve a problem peculiarto them." (emphasis added)).
183. See supranotes 51-53 and accompanying text.
184. See Murdock, supra note 46, at 470 ('The most common form of alternative remedy is
the buy-out of the minority shareholder."); 1 'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14,
§ 1.16, at 97 (noting that buyouts "are the most common remedy for dissension within a close
corporation" (emphasis added)); see also Thompson, supranote 37, at 231 ('CThe increased use of
buyouts as a remedy is the most dramatic recent change in legislative and judicial thinking on
close corporations problems.").
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ration investment. By ordering a buyout of the minority's interest at
"fair value,"" the courts are effectively replicating a market for close
corporation minority interests and are allowing oppressed shareholders to "cash out" of the business. Because the buyout remedy seeks to
provide the close corporation shareholder with the "fair value" of his
investment, it is logical to assume that the doctrine triggering the
remedy is concerned with protecting the fair value of that investment.
In summary, the absence of a developed market, the purpose of
involuntary dissolution statutes, and the prevalence of the buyout
remedy all support a conception of oppression as a doctrine that protects the fair value of a close corporation shareholder's investment.
This "investment model" of oppression sheds light on the underlying
purposes of the doctrine and provides a context for evaluating the
various oppression perspectives.
B. The Components of a Close CorporationInvestment
Although the investment model suggests that shareholder oppression protects the close corporation investment, there is still a
question about how that investment is defined. It is critical to understand that the components of a close corporation investment generally
differ from the components of a public corporation investment. In a
public corporation, the shareholder commits her capital with the expectation that her investment entitles her to a proportionate share of
the company's earnings." Accordingly, the public corporation shareholder understands that her investment return will be comprised
solely of financial sums reflecting this proportionate share (e.g., dividend payments).'87 Put differently, "[t]he shareholder of a publicly

185. The buyout statutes in several of the large commercial states are phrased in terms of
"fair value." See Thompson, supranote 35, at 718 (noting that "[s]everal of the largest commercial states permit a corporation or its majority shareholders to avoid involuntary dissolution by
purchasing the shares of the petitioning shareholders at their 'fair value' ');see also RMBCA
§ 14.34(a) (1993) ('In a proceeding under 14.30(2) to dissolve a corporation... the corporation
may elect or, if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned
by the petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the shares." (emphasis added)).
186. A 12 percent shareholder, for example, expects that her investment entitles her to 12
percent of the corporation's profits.
187. See, e.g., Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 560 ('Large corporations are usually formed as a
means of attracting capital through the sale of stock to investors, with no expectation of participation in corporate management or employment. Profit is expected through the payment of
dividends or sale of stock at an appreciated value.'); Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern
for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary
Obligation in Close Corporations,22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 663 (1992) ('The shareholder of a
publicly traded corporation may realize a return on her investment in either of two ways:
directly, by a distribution of dividends, or indirectly, by an increase in the market value of her
shares.'); see also ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
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traded corporation invests money... with a view to receiving money,
as opposed to steady employment or associational benefits, in
return."" In a close corporation, however, the shareholder typically
commits his capital with the expectation that his investment entitles
him to employment and to a management role, as well as to a proportionate share of the company's earnings. 89' Thus, a close corporation
shareholder usually understands that his investment return will be
comprised of employment benefits, management participation, and
financial sums reflecting a share of the company's earnings." The

STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS § 8.6, at 200 (2d ed. 1998) ("[The payment of a

dividend is also the basic way in which investors receive their financial return (short of selling
their stock or interest or of the company liquidating).").
188. O'Neill, supra note 187, at 663; see also Schlafge, supra note 28, at 1073 n.14 (noting
that the interest of the public corporation shareholder is 'limited to the amount of their dollar
investment in their shares, which can be sold at any time on the public market, and is not tied to
their salary and other employment benefits'); supranote 187.
189. See, e.g., Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 561 ("Unlike their counterparts in large corporations,
[close corporation minority shareholders] may expect to participate in management or to influence operations, directly or indirectly, formally or informally. Furthermore, there generally is an
expectation on the part of some participants that their interest is to be recognized in the form of
a salary derived from employment with the corporation." (citation omitted)); Balvik v. Sylvester,
411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("lit is generally understood that, in addition to supplying
capital and labor to a contemplated enterprise and expecting a fair return, parties comprising
the ownership of a close corporation expect to be actively involved in its management and
operation.'); Schlafge, supra note 28, at 1077 n.29 ("Both [public corporation and close corporation] investors expect appreciation in the value of their investment. Investors in publicly held
corporations receive dividends as a form of return on this investment, while investors in closely
held corporations may expect to receive a salary and a management position as a condition of
their investment.") (emphasis added); see also Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1992)
("Certain basic expectations of investors are enforceable in the courts, and among those is a right
to share proportionally in corporate gains.'); Bahls, supranote 14, at 330 ("Shareholders in close
corporations expect proportional distribution of the earnings of the corporation while it is
operating."); supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra notes 190, 192-98 and accompanying
text.
190. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976)
('The minority stockholder typically depends on his salary as the principal return on his investment.. .. "); Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oh. Div. 1996) ('[E]mployment
is, of course, a frequent and perfectly proper benefit of stockholders in a close corporation."); id.
at 126 (noting that "the primary benefit that [the defendant close corporation shareholder]
receives from the corporation is continued employment for himself and his family'); Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) ("A
person who.., buys a minority interest in a close corporation does so not only in the hope of
enjoying an increase in value of his stake in the business but for the assurance of employment in
the business in a managerial position.'); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387,
397 (Or. 1973) ("It is also true that the Bakers, as stockholders, had a legitimate interest in the
participation in profits earned by the corporation."); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note
14, § 1.08, at 32 ("Even if shareholders in a close corporation anticipate an ultimate profit from
the sale of shares, they usually expect (or perhaps should expect) to receive an immediate return
in the form of salaries as officers or employees of the corporation rather than in the form of
dividends on their stock.'); Murdock, supra note 46, at 468 ('CThe courts have recognized the
reality that compensation paid to those in control has a two fold function: to recompense services
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components of a close corporation investment, therefore, should be
viewed as much broader than the components of a public corporation
investment. As a consequence, the shareholder oppression doctrine
must concern itself with protecting much more 9tthan the investor's
proportionate share in the success of the company.
Significantly, for many close corporation investors, the desire
for employment (and, to some extent, management participation) is
the principal enticement motivating their decision to commit capital to
the venture.192 Indeed, a close corporation job carries significant benefits with it that are generally absent from other types of employment.
First, as the owners of a small company, close corporation sharehold-

and to provide a return on investment.'); Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 21 (noting that a close
corporation shareholder "often invests for the purpose of having a job, and the salary and other
benefits he receives is conceived to be part of the return on his investment"); id. at 18 ("In a
closely held corporation, a shareholder who is also an employee has interests in his job and stock
that are often economically intertwined.'); id. at 21 ("[T]he discharge of an employee in a closely
held corporation usually involves appropriation of a portion of his investment as a shareholder.');
Schlafge, supra note 28, at 1094 ("Section 302A.751 [the Minnesota statute protecting minority
shareholders] recognizes that shareholders in a closely held corporation legitimately expect a
return of their investment, often in the form of a management position and a salary."); see also
supra note 189 and accompanying text.
191. Cf Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 565 (N.C. 1983) (rejecting an argument
that a close corporation shareholder is entitled to relief only when "traditional shareholder
rights" have been infringed: 'While it may be true that a shareholder in... a publicly held
corporation may have 'rights or interests' defined as defendants argue, a shareholder's rights in a
closely held corporation may not necessarily be so narrowly defined.... Put another way, [a close
corporation shareholder's] 'reasonable expectations' are not as limited as defendants contend).
192. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) (" 'As a matter
of fact, providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason why he participated in organizing the corporation.' ') (quoting F. HODGE O'NEAL, O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 1.07, at 21-22 (2d ed. 1971)); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14,
§ 1.08, at 31-32 ("Providing for employment may have been the principal reason why the shareholder participated in organizing the corporation.'); see also Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662 ("A
guaranty of employment with the corporation may have been one of the 'basic reason[s] why a
minority owner has invested capital in the firm.'") (quoting Symposium, The Close Corporation,
52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 392 (1957)); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d
901, 903 (App. Div. 1985) ("Although the exact amount of the capital contribution is disputed,
petitioner utilized his own funds in getting this new venture underway, not snply as an investment, but to provide employment and a future for himself.'); Alyse J. Ferraro, Note, Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.: The Battle Between Ownershipand Employment in the Close Corporation, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 193, 215 (1990) ("As the majority emphasizes, Ingle was compensated
for the sale of his shares, but to believe that the dollar amount received met his expectations
would be to dismiss his purpose in acquiring those shares. Ingle had reasonably expected his
employment to continue until he chose to retire or to acquire his own Ford dealership....');
Murdock, supra note 46, at 468 ('That people often invest in a closely held corporation to provide
a job is almost self-evident....'); id. ('To deny a minority shareholder employment when a job
was part of his rationale in investing is oppressive, as is the failure to pay dividends to nonemployee shareholders when employed shareholders are receiving de facto dividends through
salaries." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); id. at 472 ("[W]hat is at stake in the 'oppression'
cases is often a job-a very attractive job."); Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 21 (noting that a close
corporation shareholder "often invests for the purpose of having a job?).
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ers are generally able to pay themselves a higher salary than they
would earn in comparable non-ownership positions.'9 3 Second, the
principal shareholders of a close corporation often agree to parcel out
the officer and other high-level management positions to themselves.'
This assurance of a high-level management role is valuable, as it is
generally associated with greater salary and prestige.'95 Finally, close
corporation employment typically carries the intangible benefits of
owning a business and working for oneself.'" These intangible benefits
may be significant in comparison to employment as a subordinate in
someone else's company. Thus, the loss of a close corporation job may
inflict great harm upon a shareholder, even if that shareholder is still
receiving his proportionate share of the company's earnings. " Put

193. See 1 'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supranote 14, § 3:07, at 70 n.6 (noting that "the special prerogatives enjoyed by a majority in a close corporation not infrequently block the sale of a close
corporation because the majority has difficulty obtaining such lucrative employment elsewhere"
(citing Hetherington, supra note 171, at 20 n.72); SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY, &
ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD
COMPANIES 121 (3d ed. 1996) ("It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful
closely held company earning a greater amount in annual compensation than the amount an
equivalent nonowner employee would earn as compensation."); see also Bonavita,692 A.2d at 124
("[W]hile there is no claim that the [close corporation] salaries are excessive, neither was there a
showing that if the 'inside' employment were terminated those family members could earn as
much elsewhere."); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the annual
compensation of a shareholder-employee of a commercial printing business "was in excess of
$250,000"). This proposition, of course, assumes a comparison between similar jobs in businesses
at similar stages of development.
194. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60 & n.9 (observing that all of the close corporation
participants were directors of the company and that the offices of president, treasurer, and clerk
were held by each of the participants over the years); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384
(N.D. 1987) (noting that both participants in a close corporation were directors of the company
and observing that one shareholder-employee served as the president while the other served as
the vice-president).
195. See O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 3:07, at 67 (referring to the "prestige, privileges, and patronage that come from controlling a corporation and occupying its principal
offices"); cf. id. § 3:06, at 47 ("[L]osing the prestige of a directorship may be of considerable
consequence to the shareholder.").
196. See Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J.,
dissenting) (noting "the challenge, the independence, the prestige, the feeling of achievement,
and the other intangible benefits of being part of the management of a successfully run small
company"); Bahls, supra note 14, at 290-91 (noting that close corporation ownership includes
"the social status and challenge of operating one's own company and the satisfaction of providing
employment to one's children"); id. at 319 n.212 (mentioning the 'loss of satisfaction and other
qualitative perks associated with operating a business"); O'Neill, supra note 187, at 668, 671
(describing the "psychological payoffs" that an "owner-manager" anticipates as a result of
investing in a venture, including "the pleasure of being one's own boss, the feeling of satisfaction
in creating a viable enterprise and even the excitement of taking a substantial risk"); cf.
Bonavita,692 A.2d at 124 ("[O]f course, a job in the family business probably provides considerably more security than one might find in other employment.").
197. Close corporations often distribute their corporate earnings through salary and other
job-related benefits rather than through the declaration of dividends. See supra note 44 and
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differently, the loss of a close corporation job "may eliminate a unique
employment position that was fundamental to the shareholderemployee's decision to commit capital to the venture."'' 8
C. ConstructingHypothetical Investment Bargains
If protecting the investment was the only relevant policy objective of the shareholder oppression doctrine,'" the pure minority perspective would clearly be preferable given its operation as an absolute
protector of minority interests.2 " Majority shareholders, however, also
have interests that must be factored into the analysis. Indeed, an
effort to balance the majority's interest in making business decisions
against the minority's interest in protecting the investment should be
seen as an important aspect of the doctrine's operation."' Thus, the
oppression inquiry reduces to the following difficult question: to what
extent should the shareholder oppression doctrine sacrifice protecting
the minority's investment in order to further the majority's interest in
running the business as it sees fit? To answer this question, one must

accompanying text. When a shareholder is terminated from employment, therefore, the shareholder may be cut off from her proportionate share of the corporate earnings. See Nagy v. Riblet
Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many closely held firms endeavor to show no
profits (to minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real economic returns of the business to the
investors as salary. When firms are organized in this way, firing an employee is little different
from canceling his shares.') (emphasis added); Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup.
Ct. 1986), affd, 511 N.Y.S.2d 776 (App. Div. 1987) ('In a close corporation, since dividends are
often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the functional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends."). It is critical to recognize, however, that significant harm may result from the loss of a close corporation job even if the investor is still receiving
a proportionate share of the corporate earnings through dividends or other non-employment
mechanisms. Close corporation employment, in other words, has value beyond its use as a
vehicle for distributing the earnings of the business. Having a close corporation job, in and of
itself, has significant value that often induces a shareholder's commitment of capital to the
venture. See Moll, supra note 29, at 548-51; supranotes 192-96 and accompanying text.
198. Moll, supra note 29, at 550; see also Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 19-20 (observing that
"[i]n many cases, a shareholder in a closely held corporation expects to receive... compensating
benefits through employment," and describing the benefits of close corporation employment).
199. See supraPart V.A.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 83, 96.
201. See, e.g., Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1387 (N.J. 1996) (noting that "minority shareholders' expectations must ... be balanced against the corporaion's ability to
exercise its business judgment and run its business efficiently'); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551, 572 (N.C. 1983) (Martin, J., concurring) (observing that the oppression inquiry
requires "a consideration and balancing of all the circumstances of the case in determining
whether relief should be granted and, if so, the extent, nature and method of such relief');
Hillman, supra note 27, at 60 (suggesting that an oppression standard should "develop a satisfactory method for balancing the competing interests and expectations of minority and majority
shareholders'); Miller, supra note 98, at 258 ('The courts must balance the interests of minority
shareholders against the majority's interest in making business decisions and limiting the
minority shareholder's power.").
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make fundamental assumptions about the understandings that would
have been reached by objectively reasonable close corporation shareholders if, at the inception of the venture,"2 they had bargained over
how their investments should be protected.2 3
It is important to understand the purpose of constructing these
hypothetical investment bargains. Compared to public corporation
rules, both majority and minority perspectives of oppression impose
greater restrictions on the majority's decision-making discretion.' To

202. See supranotes 61, 70 and accompanying text.
203. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 293 (1986) ("If a court is unavoidably entwined in a dispute, it must decide
what the parties would have bargained for had they written a completely contingent contract.");
id. at 291 ("Properly interpreted, fiduciary duties should approximate the bargain the parties
themselves would have reached had they been able to negotiate at low cost."); id. at 298 ('The
right inquiry is always what the parties would have contracted for had transactions costs been
zero."); see also Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A 'fiduciary' duty
to investor-employees, which protects the return on investment, then may approximate the
terms the investors would have accepted had they bargained expressly."); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 246 ("Completely overlooked in all of this rhetoric was the basic
question-which outcome would the parties have selected had they contracted in anticipation of
this contingency?").
204. Indeed, under public corporation rules, courts rarely interfere with employment, management, and dividend decisions, as the business judgment rule is often invoked to protect the
majority's discretion. See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text. When these matters are
challenged in the close corporation context, however, even a pure majority approach presumably
subjects the majority's decision to greater scrutiny than a business judgment rule approach. Cf.
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (stating, in a
close corporation dispute, that "[t]he judgment... necessarily disregards the general judicial
reluctance to interfere with a corporation's dividend policy ordinarily based upon the business
judgment of its directors"); O'Neill, supranote 187, at 692 ('The burden-shifting scheme devised
in Wilkes effectively deprives majority shareholders of the protection of the business judgment
rule by requiring close judicial scrutiny of the majority's action whenever the minority is
harmed."); id. at 690 & n.155 ("Courts in some jurisdictions have refused to apply the business
judgment rule to close corporations in an effort to correct the squeeze out problem" (citing Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)). But see Peeples, supranote 69, at 498 (noting that "[t]he first
prong of the Wilkes test tracks the traditional business judgment rule analysis"). Indeed, under
any majority perspective, a majority shareholder presumably has to prove that its motive for
action is legitimate and is not pretextual. In contrast, under the business judgment rule, the
majority shareholder need only articulate a rational business purpose for its conduct. See, e.g.,
Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close CorporationConflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 129, 154 (1987) ("So long as the controlling stockholder's conduct is not outrageousthat is, a plausible business reason can be articulated-his decisions are protected by the business judgment rule."); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A
board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be
disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose."); Kamin v. American
Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976) (granting
defendants' motion to dismiss on business judgment rule grounds); Chittur, supra,at 155 (noting
that, under the business judgment rule, "[clorporate management has never been obliged to
disclose its true motivation, and can 'easily manufacture a 'legitimate' corporate purpose for its
action' ") (footnote omitted) (quoting Gary G. Lynch & Marc I. Steinberg, The Legitimacy of
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this extent, both perspectives recognize that the close corporation
shareholder has distinctive expectations about his investment, and
about the majority's discretion to affect his investment, that warrant
special judicial treatment. 5 The "superior" oppression perspective,
however, is the perspective whose operation conforms most closely to
these distinctive expectations. As a consequence, such expectations
must be identified. This task is accomplished by constructing hypothetical investment bargains-i.e., by envisioning hypothetical bargaining sessions between reasonable close corporation shareholders
over how their investments should be protected, and by deriving the
likely understandings that would ultimately be reached at those sessions.' Put differently, to convince the objectively reasonable investor
to commit a substantial part of his savings to a close corporation,'
what understandings would the shareholders probably have to reach?
In wrestling with this question, it is important to recall that
many close corporation investors-both majority and minority owners-see their investments as comprised of multiple components. The
typical close corporation shareholder, in other words, expects that her
return on investment will consist of employment benefits, management participation, and a proportionate share of the company's earnings.' Given this proposition, it necessarily follows that reasonable
close corporation shareholders would have reached at least three
understandings if they had bargained at the venture's inception.
First, if reasonable close corporation shareholders had bargained about the possibility of a freeze-out, they would likely reach an
understanding that a freeze-out is impermissible. Because of the
importance of the investment, all of the shareholders presumably

Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 926 (1979)). Minority perspective
courts, of course, clearly provide greater protection than the business judgment rule. Indeed,
even if the majority proves that its motive for action is both legitimate and genuine, liability may
still result if the minority's reasonable expectations are frustrated.
205. Indeed, the shareholder oppression doctrine represents a set of special judicial rules for
close corporation disputes. See supra note 204. The majority and minority perspectives of
oppression, therefore, simply reflect different approaches to this set of special rules. As mentioned, therefore, this Article is considering which approach to the special rules is superior,
rather than whether the special rules should exist at all. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
206. See supranote 203.
207. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ('Typically, the minority stockholder in a close
corporation has a substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation.'); In
re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that a close corporation minority
shareholder "put his life savings into the venture'); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48, at
237 (observing that "[i]nvestors in close corporations often put a great deal of their wealth at
stake'); 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:03, at 4 (noting that a close corporation
investor "may put practically everything he owns into the business').
208. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
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realize that theft of the investment, or any part of the investment, is
intolerable."° In the conventional freeze-out scenario, however, most
(if not all) of the components of the shareholder's investment are effectively stolen with no justification.2 1 In bargaining over the possibility
of a freeze-out, therefore, it seems likely that minority shareholders
would have refused to invest in the venture if the majority shareholder had insisted upon the retention of his freeze-out discretion. In
other words, to appease the minority shareholders and to induce them
to commit capital to the business, the majority shareholder would
likely have had to promise that his freeze-out discretion would not be
utilized.
Second, if reasonable close corporation shareholders had bargained over the possibility of "forfeiting" the employment and management aspects of their investments as a result of their own
misconduct or incompetence, they would probably reach an understanding that such forfeiture is proper. 1 ' Indeed, both majority and
minority shareholders are likely to realize that a productive business

209. See, e.g., Bradley, supranote 101, at 840 ("Never should the minority participant be understood as assenting to the effective confiscation of his or her investment....').
210. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1986); In re Burack, 524
N.Y.S.2d 457, 459-60 (App. Div. 1988); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d
901, 903-04 (App. Div. 1985).
211. Although reasonable close corporation shareholders would likely agree that the employment and management aspects of their investments could be forfeited as a result of their
own misconduct or incompetence, it does not necessarily follow that a "blameworthy" shareholder
could also be denied his proportionate share of the corporate earnings or his other rights as a
general stockholder. Indeed, from a minority perspective, there is a difference between a shareholder's general reasonable expectation of proportionately sharing in the corporate earnings, and
a shareholder's specific reasonable expectation of an entitlement to certain benefits (e.g., employment, management participation). See Moll, supra note 29, at 553-56 (discussing the
distinction between "general" and "specific" reasonable expectations). While misconduct or
incompetence may cause a shareholder to "forfeie' his specific reasonable *expectation of continued employment or management participation, such minority fault does not necessarily affect
the shareholder's general reasonable expectation of sharing proportionately in the profits of the
business. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (concluding that a minority
shareholder's termination was not oppressive in light of the minority's "unsatisfactory performance," but noting that the minority's expectation of dividends was a separate issue that could
potentially establish an independent oppression claim); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014,
1021 (Sup. Ct. 1984) ('The other shareholders need not allow [a minority shareholder who stole
from the corporation] to return to employment with the corporation, but they must by some
means allow him to share in the profits."); id. at 1022 (allowing a majority shareholder to
terminate and exclude a minority shareholder who stole from the business, but ordering the
majority to "either alter the corporate financial structure so as to commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable offer to buy out [the minority's] interest"). In majority perspective terms, it may be proper and justified to terminate the employment of a shareholder who has
engaged in misconduct or incompetence, but it does not necessarily follow that it is also proper
and justified to exclude that shareholder from his proportionate share of the corporate returns.
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operation requires loyalty and competence from employees and managers. More importantly, objectively-speaking, people generally understand and assume the risk of negative consequences stemming
from their own fault.' It seems likely that if reasonable close corporation shareholders had bargained over the possibility of losing portions
of their investments for misconduct or incompetence, the risk would
have been considered tolerable and commitments of capital would still
have been made. "13

212. The North Carolina decision of Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983),
suggests a judicial acceptance of this proposition. In Meiselman, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina construed a state statute that granted judges the " 'power to liquidate the assets and
business of a corporation in an action by a shareholder when it is established' that 'l]iquidation
is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder.' " Id. at 560 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1955), amended by, § 55-14-30(2)
(1999)). In construing the statute, the court noted that the aggrieved shareholder must prove
that his "expectation has been frustrated" and that "the frustration was without fault of plaintiff
and was in large part beyond his control." Id. at 564 (emphasis added); see id. at 572 (Martin, J.,
concurring) ('If it is determined that plaintiffs rights or interests require protection because of
plaintiffs own conduct, it would be improper to grant equitable relief. He who seeks equity must
do equity.'); see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1029 (N.J. 1993) ("A court could
reasonably determine that unfairness would result if a minority shareholder were permitted to
seek judicial intervention after years of acquiescence or participation in the alleged misconduct.'); 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:01, at 2 ('Tinority shareholders may be so
uncooperative and act so unreasonably and improperly that controlling shareholders are justified
in moving to eliminate them from the enterprise... "); 2 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14,
§ 7:15, at 94 n.15 (" 'As a practical matter, there is something anomalous about permitting a
shareholder's laziness, absenteeism and/or inefficiency to confront the controlling shareholders
with a Hobson's choice of retaining him at full pay or risking dissolution and all the adverse
financial and tax consequences that come in its wake ... ' " (quoting Letter from Joseph L.
Hutner to F. Hodge O'Neal (May 5, 1990))); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 203, at 295 ("It is
hard to imagine... how closely held corporations could function under a requirement that all
shareholders have an 'equal opportunity' to receive salary increases and continue in office
regardlessof theirconduct." (emphasis added)); Hillman, supra note 27, at 55 (noting the "allocation of adverse economic consequences on the basis of fault" as a possible policy objective); id. at
77 (noting that a prerequisite for relief under an expectations-based analysis should be that "the
failure to achieve the expectation was in large part beyond the control of the participant"); id. at
80 ("Requiring that the dissatisfied shareholder not be responsible for the failure to achieve his
or her own expectations may appear to be one of the more arguable of the prerequisites for relief.
The absence of such a condition, however, would enable a dissatisfied shareholder to obtain relief
by simply sabotaging the expectations.'); Miller, supra note 98, at 233-34 (stating that "relief
may be denied to minority shareholders whose behavior justifies the majority's conduct"); Sandra
K. Miller, A Note on the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders: How Can
the Reasonable Expectations Standardbe Reasonably Applied in Pennsylvania?,12 J.L. & COM.
51, 68 (1992) ('The minority's expectations may be frustrated where his misconduct is perceived
as being the cause leading up to the frustration of his expectations.'); Prentice, supranote 90, at
145 ("Prima facie exclusion from corporate affairs should give rise to a remedy .... Circumstances might exist, however, justifying such exclusion. For example, where it
can be proven that the excluded member was the author of his own fate then he should not be
afforded any relief.').
213. There may be some distinction between "willful" misconduct or incompetence and similar "non-purposeful" behavior. To the extent that willful misconduct or incompetence is within
the control of the shareholder, it is likely that the reasonable shareholder would agree to assume
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Third, and most importantly, if reasonable close corporation
shareholders had bargained over an arrangement allowing their investments to be harmed whenever any legitimate business purpose
was served, they would very likely reach an understanding that rejected such an arrangement. 4 Indeed, reasonable shareholders are
apt to refuse to invest if they realize that their employment or management role can be eliminated whenever any corporate interest is
furthered. Put differently, because close corporation shareholders view
their investments as having three central components-an employment position, a management role, and a proportionate share of the
company's earnings -- it should not be assumed that reasonable
shareholders would permit one investment component to be harmed
for any benefit in another.
For example, assume that a majority shareholder terminates
the employment of a 33% minority shareholder and vice president
because the minority shareholder, although competent, can be replaced by a more efficient and less expensive machine. Assume further
that there is evidence indicating that this replacement will allow the
corporation to earn an additional $10,000 in yearly profits. If the
terminated vice president previously earned a $100,000 salary in his
close corporation position and can only obtain comparable employment
at an $80,000 salary, the termination has a very negative effect on the
shareholder's overall investment value. Indeed, although the "company earnings" component of the shareholder's investment has increased by $3,333 per year (33% of the $10,000 in additional profits),
the elimination of the employment component has resulted in a loss of
1 ' Although the termination seems to serve a
at least $20,000 per year."

the risk of forfeiting portions of his investment because of such purposeful behavior. It is not
clear that the reasonable shareholder would assume a similar risk, however, if portions of the
investment could be forfeited for non-purposeful conduct-i.e., for conduct that is beyond the
control of the shareholder. For example, at the venture's inception, if the investors had discussed the possibility of termination due to a physical or mental disability that subsequently
arises and that renders a shareholder unable to perform his job tasks, a reasonable shareholder
may have declined to commit capital to the business if such a termination did not give rise to
liability. When the risk of forfeiture is within the shareholder's control, in other words, it is
much more likely that the reasonable shareholder would consider such a risk to be tolerable.
When such a risk is outside of the shareholder's control, however, the risk may exceed tolerable
bounds and the reasonable shareholder may decline to invest. See infra note 225 (discussing the
potential differences in treatment arising from "willful" versus "non-willful" conduct).
214. This assumes, of course, a legitimate business purpose not stemming from the shareholders' own misconduct or incompetence. See supranotes 211-13 and accompanying text.
215. See supranotes 189-90 and accompanying text.
216. The reduced salary may'not represent the only loss of value stemming from the termination. Assume that the second company does not name the former vice president to a director
or officer position. The loss of such a position may result in a significant loss of prestige. Moreo-
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legitimate business purpose-i.e., it increases corporate profits by
$10,000 a year-the minority shareholder's investment is severely
damaged. If reasonable close corporation shareholders had bargained
over this point at the inception of the venture, they would be unlikely
to reach an understanding that allows their overall investment value
to be harmed whenever any corporate purpose is served."7 In fact, if
the majority shareholder had insisted on such an understanding, it is
likely that the reasonable minority shareholder would have refused to
invest. 18 Once again, therefore, to convince minority shareholders to
commit capital to the business, the majority shareholder would probably have had to concede his discretion to act in furtherance of any
corporate purpose.
When employment is at issue, this proposition can be even
more forcefully asserted. At a minimum, employment is typically a
component of the close corporation shareholder's investment.19 In
many (if not most) cases, however, employment is the principalcomponent of such an investment.'s Indeed, many close corporations are
small start-up businesses that face a high risk of failure." Because of

ver, to the extent that the former vice president is now working as a subordinate in someone
else's company, his discharge has resulted in an additional loss of intangible value. See supra
notes 194-97 and accompanying text. Thus, even if the majority shareholder declares a $20,000
dividend to compensate the terminated minority shareholder for his $20,000 reduction in salary,
the termination may still have a negative effect on the minority's overall investment value.
At some point, of course, the proportional increase in corporate profitability will exceed the
losses to the other components of the minority's investment. For example, if the terminationrelated losses of salary, prestige, and intangible value totaled $30,000 a year, but the termination allowed the corporation to earn an additional $120,000 in yearly profits, the minority
shareholder would presumably have no objection to his termination of employment. Indeed,
although the elimination of the employment component results in a $30,000 annual loss to the
minority shareholder, the termination has increased the corporate earnings component of the
shareholder's investment by $40,000 annually (33% of the $120,000 in additional profits). Thus,
the shareholder's overall investment has increased in value as a result of his termination. In
actuality, of course, it is difficult (if not impossible) to quantify the termination-related losses of
prestige and intangible value. The fact that the minority shareholder has sued over the termination, however, implies that the minority shareholder's overall investment did not increase in
value as a result of the termination.
217. See Cox, supra note 144, at 635 ("On a matter as sensitive as defining the rights upon
which the economic welfare of minority holders depends, there is every reason to believe that
such holders would not be content to assign those rights for any purpose served by a transaction.").
218. Cf. Miller, supra note 212, at 77-78 ("An overly broad interpretation of business purpose
could undermine the goals of the reasonable expectation standard.').
219. See supranotes 189-90 and accompanying text.
220. See supranote 192 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE E-MYTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSINESSES
DON'T WORK AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (1995). As Gerber observes:
Businesses start and fail in the United States at an increasingly staggering rate. Every
year, over a million people in this country start a business of some sort. Statistics tell us
that by the end of the first year at least 40 percent of them will be out of business.
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the uncertainty surrounding whether the business will have any
earnings at all, let alone earnings growth or consistency,' the close
corporation shareholder's initial decision to invest is often based primarily on the definitive benefits of close corporation employment,
rather than on the speculative possibilities of earnings growth.' In
this context, one should not assume that the reasonable shareholder
would have accepted an arrangement allowing her principal investment component to be damaged for any increase in the corporate

wealth.

I
It is important to underscore that these hypothetical bargains,
as well as the understandings resulting from them, are not based upon
mere speculation. To the contrary, they all derive from a proposition
that is well-established among courts and commentators-i.e., close
corporation shareholders consider their investments to be comprised
of multiple components. 4 Once that proposition is accepted, the hypothetical bargains and resulting understandings logically follow. For
example, if close corporation shareholders consider their investments
to be comprised of employment, management participation, and a
share of the corporate profits, the unjustified theft of one or more of
those components would naturally be unacceptable. Similarly, to the

Within five years, more than 80 percent of them... will have failed.... [Miore than 80
percent of the small businesses that survive the first five years fail in the second five.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:04, at 8 (describing
close corporations as "small business enterprises); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS AND COMPETITION 29 (1997) ("Fewer than half of all new firms are
in operation after five years.'); U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Office of Advocacy, Small Business
Answer Card (last modified Apr. 20, 1999) ("Business turnover is the domain of small business.")
<http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/stats/ec_anscd.html>; O'Neill, supra note 187, at 668 n.84 ("The
risk of failure of the small business enterprise is notoriously high.'); Ragazzo, supra note 19, at
19 ("Small businesses are exceedingly risky enterprises with high failure rates.").
222. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 221, at 2 (noting that "hundreds of thousands of people
every year... pour their energy and capital-and life-into starting a small business and fail,"
and stating that "many others... struggle along for years simply trying to survive"); supra note
221.
223. See, e.g, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) ("Typically,
the minority stockholder in a close corporation has a substantial percentage of his personal
assets invested in the corporation. The stockholder may have anticipated that his salary from
his position with the corporation would be his livelihood." (citation omitted)); Muellenberg v.
Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1385 (N.J. 1996) (noting that participation in the business is the
"principal source of employment and income" for many close corporation shareholders); 1
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 14, § 1.08, at 31 (noting that a shareholder's participation in a close corporation is often his "principal or sole source of income"); 1 O'NEAL,
OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:03, at 4 ("[A close corporation shareholder] may put practically
everything he owns into the business and expect to support himself from the salary he receives
as a key employee of the company. Whenever a shareholder is deprived of employment by the
corporation.., he may be in effect deprived of his principal means of livelihood."); see also supra
note 192 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
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extent that each of the components is valuable, it logically follows that
the shareholders would not tolerate an investor who willfully engages
in conduct that damages the corporation and that correspondingly
damages the corporate profitability components of their investments.'
Finally, the ability to eliminate one aspect of the investment for any
increase in the corporate profitability component would run counter to
the recognition that the overall value of the investment stems from
the presence of all three components.

225. If the shareholder's misconduct or incompetence is not willful, however, difficult issues
arise. See supranote 213. Once again, to the extent that corporate profitability is an element of
the close corporation investment, it logically follows that the shareholders would not tolerate an
investor who willfully engages in conduct that damages the corporation. Much of the case law
upholding the termination of a close corporation shareholder is consistent with this notion, as
the cases involve shareholders who purposefully engage in conduct detrimental to the corporation. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (noting "plaintiffs failure
to... learn the business" and that plaintiff "quit on more than one occasion... without reason
or notice); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019-20 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (observing that
plaintiff "stole from the corporation'); cf. Hillman, supra note 27, at 80 n.249 ("A different set of
considerations arises when employment is available on reasonable terms but the shareholder is
unwilling to perform services. The dissatisfied shareholder who has or had the ability to cause
the achievement of his or her own expectations is not a proper subject for relief.... ."). Where
the element of "willful" or "purposeful" conduct is absent, however, the position of the terminated
shareholder is more sympathetic. For example, if a shareholder makes a good-faith effort to
perform adequately in his job but ultimately proves to lack the intelligence necessary for the
competent performance of his tasks, should a termination of the shareholder give rise to oppression liability? On the one hand, the shareholder's incompetence is solely his own fault. To the
extent that allocating negative economic consequences on the basis of fault is an appropriate
policy objective, see id. at 55, the terminated shareholder is undeserving of protection. On the
other hand, the absence of willful conduct separates this shareholder from the purposeful
activity at issue in the existing oppression precedents. As a consequence, it may be appropriate
to view this type of case in a more favorable light. As one commentator observed:
Much more difficult issues arise when the shareholder is willing but not able to perform
services for the enterprise because of a limitation not apparent at the inception of the relationship. This may be for any one of a number of reasons, including lack of a required
skill or intellectual capacity, a physical or mental disability, or an inability to adapt to
the business. Where the assumptions upon which the employment expectation is based
are subsequently proven to be erroneous, and it is beyond the power of the participant to
achieve that expectation, then providing relief is preferable to requiring that the participant continue to commit funds to an enterprise from which he or she will receive little or
no benefit.
Id. at 81; see also Hughes v. Sego Int'l Ltd., 469 A.2d 74, 77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983). As
the Hughes court noted:
The [trial] judge stated ...that the reason for [the minority's] termination was... that
the individual defendants were dissatisfied with the result of his sales efforts. Although
[the trial judge] determined that plaintiffs termination was a good faith business judgment.... [the defendants] dissatisfaction with [the minority] was not the result of any
failure on [the minority's] part to perform his duties credibly and conscientiously. Thus,
plaintiffs lack of effectiveness was not due to misconduct. Accordingly, the [trial] judge
concluded.., that the termination of [the minority's] employment under these circumstances constitutes oppressive conduct ....
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Because the hypothetical bargains and resulting understandings all stem from an established proposition, this Article maintains
that the understandings should be accepted as valid and accurate
statements about the rationale of shareholders who invest in close
corporations. Indeed, the understandings capture the distinctive expectations held by the reasonable close corporation shareholder about
his investment, and about the majority's ability to affect his investment. More precisely, this Article asserts that the understandings
should be accepted as the presumptive terms of the business deal that
typical close corporation shareholders make. When majority conduct
runs counter to these mutually-understood "terms," the majority
should be viewed as having breached the deal that was presumptively
struck between the parties." As a consequence, oppression liability
should arise.
D. Choosing the "Right"Perspective
If the understandings resulting from the hypothetical bargains
reflect both the distinctive expectations of the reasonable close corporation shareholder and the presumptive terms of the business deal
that typical close corporation shareholders make, then the superior
oppression perspective is the one that conforms most closely to these
understandings. The pure majority perspective fails in this regard, as
it allows the shareholder's investment to be harmed for any corporate
purpose.'l Indeed, the pure majority perspective gives no explicit
consideration to the damage inflicted on the minority's interests. As
long as a corporate purpose is found, minority shareholder relief is
denied without any inquiry into the minority's plight."s
A pure minority perspective, on the other hand, gives shortshrift to the majority's legitimate expectation of running a productive

226. See Miller, supra note 212, at 54 (describing the reasonable expectations approach as a
"departure from the bargain struck by the majority and minority shareholders'); see also In re
Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The Court may determine the understanding of
the parties as to the role the complaining shareholder is expected to play from agreements and
evidence submitted. The Court can then decide whether the controlling shareholders have acted
contrary to that understanding or, in the language of the statute, 'have been guilty of oppressive
actions toward the complaining shareholders."'); Bahls,. supra note 14, at 325 (noting that
"expectations are reasonable when they provide a basis for the bargain); Murdock, supra note
46, at 465 (noting that when applying the reasonable expectations standard, "the crux is not
identifying a traditional wrong but rather identifying the basis of the bargain-what were the
explicit or implicit conditions pursuant to which the parties associated themselves together in
the corporate form").
227. See supra Part MlI.A.
228. See supra Part III.A.
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business with competent and loyal associates. Once a minority shareholder establishes a basic understanding that was shared by everyone
at the venture's inception, a pure minority court protects that understanding as a "reasonable expectation" regardless of the circumstances
before the court.'u A minority shareholder's misconduct or incompetence in his job, for example, is seemingly ignored once a basic understanding of employment is proven."o By not considering what the
parties would have likely understood if they had bargained over these
circumstances, the pure minority perspective overemphasizes minority
rights and wrongfully excludes any consideration of majority concerns.
The modified majority perspective has the potential to conform
to the understandings from the hypothetical bargains, but only if the
less harmful alternative language is interpreted to place minority
interests reasonably ahead of corporate interests. "3' The "reasonably
ahead" notion is needed in order to prevent the modified majority
perspective from overprotecting the minority's interests in situations
of minority misconduct or incompetence." If the less harmful alternative restriction is construed to place minority interests ahead of corporate interests except when the minority's own fault is at issue, the
modified majority perspective will conform to the understandings from
the hypothetical bargains. 3 Indeed, when construed in this manner,
majority actions benefiting the corporation will still trigger oppression
liability as long as the minority's interests are harmed through no
fault of its own.
The courts, however, are unlikely to attach such a pro-minority
construction to the less harmful alternative language. The background
of the Wilkes decision, for example, suggests that the less harmful
alternative language was not intended to signify a pro-minority position."" In Wilkes, the factual circumstances at issue demonstrated a
clear freeze-out. Wilkes' salary was terminated, he was voted out as
an officer and director, and he received no dividend payments from the
corporation."s Moreover, the majority had no justification for its actions.' Simply put, the majority's conduct was far from borderlineits conduct was classically oppressive and there was no question that

229. See supratext accompanying notes 92-93.
230. See, e.g., Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362; Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D.
1987); supranotes 91-93 and accompanying text.
231. See supraPart IV.A. (discussing the modified majority perspective).
232. See supratext accompanying notes 130-34.
233. Moreover, with this construction, the modified majority perspective will function identically to the modified minority perspective.
234. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 658-61 (Mass. 1976).
235. See id. at 658, 662 n.13.
236. See id. at 663.
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the majority had abused its business discretion. On the facts of Wilkes,
therefore, it is curious why the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts felt the need to soften the minority-friendly Donahue duty with
the more majority-friendly legitimate business purpose inquiry. One
plausible explanation is that the court was gravely concerned that its
Donahue duty and accompanying equal opportunity rule were too
destructive of majority prerogatives." Consequently, the court
pounced on its first opportunity to soften the standard, despite the
egregiousness of the majority's conduct in the particular case."O To the
extent that this explanation is valid, it suggests that the Wilkes legitimate business purpose inquiry was intended to provide the majority with greater flexibility to make decisions." Construing the less
harmful alternative language to place minority interests over corporate interests would undercut this intentional effort to favor the majority and is, therefore, an unlikely construction. It is much more
plausible to assume that the Wilkes court intended the less harmful
alternative language to protect the minority shareholder only when
the minority can propose an alternative course of action that is comparable to the majority's conduct in terms of corporate expense and
feasibility. The Wilkes court arguably suggested as much by noting
that the legitimate business purpose must be weighed against the
"practicability" of a less harmful alternative." Of course, if a modified
majority court favors corporate interests over minority interests, the
modified majority perspective does not conform to the understandings

237. See supratext accompanying notes 54-55.
238. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 144, at 632 (noting that the Wilkes court "retreat[ed] from the
broad equal opportunity mandate it embraced earlier in Donahue).
239. Indeed, significant passages in the Wilkes opinion focus entirely on the need to preserve
the majority's decision-making discretion. See, e.g., supratext accompanying note 68.
240. Cf. Peeples, supra note 69, at 500 ('The tone of the Wilkes opinion suggests that a court
comparing alternative means should respect the decisions of those in control. The Wilkes court
deemed a 'large measure of discretion' appropriate." (quoting Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663)).
Courts outside of Massachusetts, of course, may have different views. Many of these courts,
however, adopted the 'less harmful" alternative language from the Wilkes court. See, e.g.,
Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 516 A.2d 132, 136 (Vt. 1986). Thus, the intent of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in adopting the less harmful alternative language may have a
significant influence on courts in other jurisdictions.
241. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; see also Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass.
1988) (noting that liability for breach of the Donahue duty will result "unless the wronged
shareholder succeeds in showing that the proffered legitimate objective could have been achieved
through a less harmful, reasonably practicable,alternative mode of action" (emphasis added));
supranote 107.
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from the hypothetical bargains. As a consequence, it is not the perspective from which shareholder oppression should be viewed. 42
The modified minority perspective, however, includes the necessary flexibility that is required to enforce the understandings from
the hypothetical bargains. By making a further inquiry into whether a
basic understanding was intended to continue in the circumstances,"'
the modified minority perspective allows a court to apply the hypothetical bargain understandings as the presumptive understandings of
the parties that were intended to govern the circumstances at issue.2'
From a modified minority perspective, therefore, a reasonable expectation exists not simply when the majority lacks a legitimate business
purpose for its actions; instead, a reasonable expectation typically
exists when it is consistent with the hypothetical bargain understandings. Because the modified minority perspective is flexible
enough to incorporate these understandings, such a perspective
should be viewed as the preferable framework for the shareholder
oppression analysis.
E. The ProperOperationof the Modified Minority Perspective
When viewing oppression from a modified minority perspective,
it is critical to recall that the inquiry into reasonable expectations
consists of two steps. First, courts have noted that reasonable expectations are based on understandings shared by all of the investors at the
inception of a business. 5 Thus, when a complaining shareholder as-

242. See Cox, supranote 144, at 635 (noting that "the more enabling standard of a business
purpose justification for unequal treatment... give[s] insufficient attention to the owners'
probable intent").
243. See supranotes 120-22 and accompanying text.
244. See infra Part V.E.
245. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[Ihe 'reasonable
expectations' test is indeed an examination into the spoken and unspoken understanding upon
which the founders relied when entering into the venture.'); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289,
1293 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (" Reasonable expectations' are those spoken and unspoken understandings on which the founders of a venture rely when commencing the venture."); see also In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) ("A court considering a petition
alleging oppressive conduct must investigate what the majority shareholders knew, or should
have known, to be the petitioner's expectations in entering the particular enterprise.); id.
(noting that unfulfilled "subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture" are insufficient to
establish an oppression claim) emphasis added)); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563
(N.C. 1983) ("Privately held expectations which are not made known to the other participants are
not 'reasonable.'"); Bahs, supranote 14, at 322-23 n.229 ("[Courts have been careful to protect
only those expectations of the minority known by and acquiesced to by the majority.'); Hillman,
supra note 27, at 78 ("[O]nly expectations embodied in understandings, express or implied,
among the participants should be recognized."); Robert W. Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 691, 728 (1985) (noting that relief may be warranted "[t]o the extent that a
minority shareholder had reasonable expectations at the inception of a venture, those expecta-
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serts that his reasonable expectation of employment or management
participation has been frustrated by majority conduct, a court must
first satisfy itself that all of the investors shared a basic understanding of employment or management participation at the outset of the
venture. More precisely, the aggrieved shareholder must offer evidence indicating that the stockholders shared a basic understanding
at the venture's inception of an entitlement to certain specific benefits
(e.g., employment, management participation) due to their commitments of capital to the business. 6 Second, a court must satisfy itself
that all of the investors intended such a basic understanding to persist
in the post-inception circumstances before the court. 47 The alleged
frustrated expectations of an aggrieved shareholder are deemed "reasonable" and worthy of protection only after both steps are accomplished.
With regard to the first step, the existence of basic understandings between the shareholders will occasionally be explicit, particularly where written documents exist that spell out those
understandings.2 48 Because close corporations often operate on a more
informal basis, however, such memorialized evidence is rare. 49 Thus,

tions were understood by other participants in the enterprise, and the prospect that the expectations will be realized is remote"); Thompson, supra note 37, at 224 (observing that a reasonable
expectations standard is based "on the parties' understandings"); supra notes 61, 69-71 and
accompanying text.
246. See Moll, supra note 29, at 552 ("An inquiry into what the shareholder reasonably expected his investment entitled him to should be seen as an attempt to link the commitment of
capital to certain expected benefits such that the benefits can be characterized as components of
the investment."); id. ("For example, an inquiry into whether a shareholder reasonably expected
continued employment should be understood as an inquiry into whether the shareholder reasonably expected that her investment in the venture entitled her to continued employment with
the close corporation.").
247. See supratext accompanying note 120.
248. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The Court may determine
the understanding of the parties as to the role the complaining shareholder is expected to play
from agreements and evidence submitted."); Hillman, supra note 27, at 78 ('The clearest type of
expectation is one which is set forth in a shareholder's agreement signed by all of the parties.");
cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3a) (West 1992) ("[A]ny written agreements, including employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, between or among shareholders or between or among
one or more shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties' reasonable
expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements.").
249. See, e.g., Chittur, supranote 204, at 160 (noting that the expectations of a close corporation shareholder "may not be articulated with lawyerly precision"); O'Neal, supra note 75, at 88384 ("A person taking a minority position in a close corporation often leaves himself vulnerable to
squeeze-out or oppression by failing to insist upon a shareholders' agreement or appropriate
charter or bylaw provisions ... ."); id. at 886 ('The participants typically enter into 'agreements'
among themselves, which sometimes are reduced to writing in the form of a formal preincorporation agreement or a shareholders' agreement, but which often are oral, perhaps just vague and
half-articulated understandings."); see also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d
554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980)
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aggrieved shareholders typically rely on circumstantial evidence
drawn from the parties' actions and course of conduct to establish the
basic understandings shared by the investors at the outset of the
business.' Because circumstantial evidence suffices to establish these

(noting that "[t]he expectations of the parties in the instant suit with regard to their participation in corporate affairs are not established by any agreement); Chittur, supra note 204, at 131
(observing that "people generally avoid complex and expensive planning in small businesses");
id. at 139 (stating that "inadequately planned close corporations will always remain part of the
picture," and noting that "[t]he most careful plan may fail to visualize some conflicts, even if it
does not generate novel ones of its own").
250. See, e.g., Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365 ('The parties' full understanding may not even be
in writing but may have to be construed from their actions.'); Thompson, supra note 37, at 217
("Expectations . . . must be gleaned from the parties' actions as well as their written documents."); cf. Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 561 (noting that "[t]he expectations of the parties in the
instant suit with regard to their participation in corporate affairs are not established by any
agreement; they must be gleaned from the evidence presented).
For example, assume that all of the shareholders in a close corporation invest a substantial
sum of capital in the business, quit their prior employment, and begin working for the close
corporation. The company pays no dividends and distributes all of its profits as salary to the
shareholders. Even without an explicit agreement, it is a fair inference that all of the shareholders implicitly understood that their investment entitled them to continued employment with the
company. Indeed, because the shareholders left their prior employment positions, they all likely
understood that the close corporation jobs would become their primary (if not sole) sources of
livelihood. See supranotes 221-23 and accompanying text. Moreover, because of the absence of
dividends, they all likely understood that a job with the corporation and its accompanying salary
would be the only vehicles for distributing the returns of the business. See supra notes 44, 197
and accompanying text. Thus, the parties' own actions suggest a shared, implicit understanding
that investment in the business entitled a shareholder to continued employment with the
company. Cf. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1388 (N.J. 1996) ("In this case, it is
reasonable to conclude that Burg's fair expectations were that should he give up his prior
employment with a competitor company and enter this small corporation, he would enjoy an
important position in the management affairs of the corporation."); In re Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd
Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (App. Div. 1985) ("As a result of their long history of
taking an active part in the running of the corporation, petitioners demonstrated that they had a
reasonable expectation that they would continue to be employed by the company, and have input
into its management.'); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) ("Balvik quit his
former job to join Sylvester in the new business enterprise, making a relatively substantial
investment in the process. It is apparent from the record that Balvik's involvement with [the
business] constituted his primary, if not sole, source of livelihood and that he quite reasonably
expected to be actively involved in the operation of the business.'); see also Hillman, supra note
27, at 78 ('CThat assumptions are not made explicit does not require that they be disregarded
when they are accepted or assumed by the other participants.").
Of course, the direct testimony of the parties can also serve as evidence of an understanding
between the shareholders. In Wilkes, for example, the court noted that "[a]t the time of incorporation it was understood by all of the parties that each would be a director of [the close corporation] and each would participate actively in the management and decision making involved in
operating the corporation." Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-60
(Mass. 1976). As evidence of this understanding, the Wilkes court recounted the following
testimony of two of the company's shareholders:
Wilkes testified before the master that, when the corporate officers were elected, all four
men "were... guaranteed directorships." Riche's understanding of the parties' intentions
was that they all wanted to play a part in the management of the corporation and wanted
to have some "say" in the risks involved; that, to this end, they would all be directors; and
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basic understandings, the first step in the modified minority inquiry is
a minimal hurdle that typically poses little difficulty for a complaining
shareholder. Significantly, however, if an aggrieved shareholder is
unable to establish a basic understanding relevant to his claim (e.g., a
shared understanding of employment), the first step in the inquiry is
not accomplished, and the shareholder's alleged frustrated expectation
should not be considered reasonable or enforceable."'
At the second step of the analysis, there is generally no evidence indicating whether the parties intended a basic understanding
to continue in the post-inception circumstances before the court. For
example, a minority shareholder may offer evidence indicating that all
of the shareholders are founders who have continuously worked for
the company since its formation. Such proof may suffice to establish
that, at the venture's inception, a basic understanding was reached
that all shareholders were entitled to employment as a result of their

that "unless you (were) a director and officer you could not participate in the decisions of
(the) enterprise."
Id. at 660 n.7.
251. In some situations, the circumstantial or other evidence will not suggest a mutual understanding at the venture's inception that investment in the company entitled a shareholder to
employment or other specific corporate benefit. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1301,
1304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (noting the need to establish a "nexus between a plaintiffs investment of capital and his employment in the corporation" before a shareholder can challenge the
denial of employment in an oppression claim). To use employment as an example, a close
corporation may have numerous shareholders without employment positions or may have no
general policy regarding stock ownership and employment. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp.,
668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996) (refusing to find that a termination of a shareholderemployee was a breach of fiduciary duty in part because "[there was no general policy regarding
stock ownership and employment, and there was no evidence that any other stockholders had
expectations of continuing employment because they purchased stock"). Alternatively, the
language of an express shareholder's agreement may negate any inference of a mutual understanding that the commitment of capital entitled an investor to employment. See, e.g., In re
Apple, 637 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (App. Div. 1996) (noting that a buyout agreement explicitly bound
each shareholder to sell "after ceasing for any reason, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to be in
the employ of the corporation," and stating that the terminated shareholder-employee "cannot be
heard to argue that he had a reasonable expectation that he would be employed and would be a
shareholder for life"); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 602, 604 (App. Div. 1988)
('The plaintiff was aware throughout his employment of the possibility that he could be discharged at the will of the defendants since he repeatedly signed agreements which provided for
his discharge 'for any reason' and for the repurchase of his interest in the corporation at that
time.'). In these circumstances, there is no evidence of a mutual understanding that a shareholder is entitled to continued employment with the company because of his investment. When
an aggrieved shareholder challenges his denial of employment, therefore, a court should not find
that a basic understanding of employment has been established. Indeed, a court should conclude
that the alleged frustrated expectation of employment is unreasonable and unenforceable. See
also Mitchell, supranote 71, at 1707 ("[1It cannot always be a breach of fiduciary duty, even in a
close corporation, to refuse or cease to employ a particular shareholder in the business.'); Moll,
supra note 29, at 559-61 (noting that not all close corporation shareholders reasonably expect
that their investment entitles them to employment).
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investments. 2 The first step in establishing a reasonable expectation
of employment would therefore be met.
Is this basic understanding of employment, however, still
shared by the parties after the venture's inception when the minority
shareholder has engaged in misconduct, or when the minority shareholder's performance is inadequate, or when the minority shareholder
can be replaced by a more efficient and less costly machine? Even after
a basic understanding at the outset of the business has been established, a modified minority court must take the second step before it
can conclude that a reasonable expectation has arisen. The modified
minority court must inquire into whether the investors intended their
basic understanding to persist in the post-inception circumstances at
issue.
It is at this second step where the understandings from the hypothetical bargains should be incorporated into the oppression analysis. As mentioned, the understandings should serve as the
presumptive terms of the deal between the shareholders. When employment is at issue, for example, the understandings from the hypothetical bargains should create a rebuttable presumption that the
investors intended for the basic understanding of employment to
persist in the absence of shareholder misconduct or incompetence.'
Thus, if the majority attempts to justify the termination of a minority
shareholder's employment on other legitimate business grounds, such
as the existence of a more productive machine or the need for professional management, the modified minority court should reject such
justifications. Instead, the court should enforce the basic understanding of employment as a continuing understanding of employment in
the circumstances-i.e., as a "reasonable expectation" of employment
in the circumstances.'
It bears repeating, however, that rebuttable presumptions are
created by the hypothetical bargain understandings. If there is evidence indicating that the parties reached a consensus contrary to
these understandings, that consensus should control as the actual
understanding of the parties that was intended to govern the particular circumstances before the court. For example, an express shareholder's agreement may give the majority shareholder the right to

252. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
253. Cf. Miller, supra note 98, at 263 (noting that "[t]o provide some guidance to shareholders, a series of acts should be presumed to indicate the existence of oppressive conduct," and
including "the restriction or preclusion of employment" as presumptively oppressive conduct).
254. See supranotes 214-23 and accompanying text. As mentioned, the minority shareholder
must first prove that the investors shared a basic understanding of employment at the venture's
inception before the second step and the rebuttable presumptions are reached.
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terminate the employment of a minority shareholder for "any reason"
or for "legitimate business reasons. " ' A contractual provision reflecting any of these terms would rebut at least one of the understandings
resulting from the hypothetical bargains.' The provision should,
therefore, be enforced as the actual understanding of the parties. In
many cases, however, the parties will not have discussed the particular circumstances before the court. Thus, they will not have reached a
consensus on whether a basic understanding was intended to continue
in those circumstances. 7 In these "unforeseen" situations, a court
should apply the presumptions created by the hypothetical bargain
understandings.
Properly understood, therefore, a modified minority perspective
entails a two-step inquiry into reasonable expectations. A shareholder
challenging the denial of specific benefits (e.g., employment, management participation) must first offer proof to establish that the investors shared a basic understanding at the venture's inception of an
entitlement to the denied benefits.' If the shareholder overcomes this
hurdle, the modified minority court must then determine if the investors intended the basic understanding to persist in the post-inception
circumstances before the court. To answer this question, a court
should apply the understandings from the hypothetical bargains as
rebuttable presumptions that will decide the case in the absence of
contrary evidence. If both steps are satisfied, the court should deem

255. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Haworth, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 591, 595 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (involving a
mandatory buyout when an employee "shall be terminated for any reason," including "involuntary events"); Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 136 (N.Y. 1989) (involving a mandatory
buy-back provision upon "voluntary resignation or other termination"); see also supranote 251.
256. For example, a shareholder's agreement allowing the majority shareholder to terminate
the employment of a minority shareholder for "any reason" or for 'legitimate business reasons"
works in a pro-majority fashion by countering the hypothetical bargain understandings that a
shareholder can be terminated for misconduct or incompetence but not for any legitimate
business purpose. See supranotes 211-23 and accompanying text.
Depending on the language of the particular shareholder's agreement, the agreement may
affect both steps of the modified minority inquiry. At the first step, for example, an agreement
stating that a minority shareholder can be terminated for "any reason" probably negates any
inference of a mutual understanding that the commitment of capital entitled an investor to
employment. See supranote 251 and accompanying text. Although the second step would not be
reached, the same language would rebut the second-step presumption that the investors intended for a basic understanding of employment to persist in the absence of shareholder misconduct or incompetence.
257. Cf. O'Neal, supranote 75, at 886 (noting that close corporation shareholders have often
reached 'just vague and half-articulated understandings").
258. The aggrieved shareholder has the burden of proof at this first step. See Thompson,
supra note 37, at 217 ("Courts permit expectations to be established outside of formal written
agreements, but the minority shareholder retains the burden of proving the existence of the
expectations."); supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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the frustrated expectation "reasonable" and should grant oppression
relief.
Ideally, this discussion of the proper operation of the modified
minority perspective will assist courts in their oppression analyses.
The discussion explicitly indicates, for example, that the initial step of
the modified minority inquiry requires evidence. Indeed, the minority
shareholder must offer minimal evidence, but evidence nonetheless, to
establish a basic understanding between the shareholders regarding
an entitlement to specific corporate benefits. Properly understood,
therefore, the initial step of the inquiry corrects the erroneous suggestion of some courts that the oppression doctrine is automatically invoked whenever a shareholder is denied a corporate benefit. 9 In
addition, and perhaps more importantly, this discussion explicitly
indicates that the second step of the modified minority inquiry does
not require evidence. Indeed, this Article is the first to propose that
rebuttable presumptions stemming from the hypothetical bargains
should be used in the analysis.' At this second step, therefore, courts
should understand that evidence is required only if a party wishes to
rebut the operative presumptions.
Aside from providing direction to courts, this discussion of the
proper operation of the modified minority perspective clarifies the
rights of both minority and majority shareholders. Aggrieved minority
shareholders should understand that, after they establish a basic
understanding shared by the investors at the venture's inception, the
law will use presumptions to protect the shareholders' expectations
without any further proof. Similarly, when majority shareholders
make certain decisions (e.g., termination decisions), they should understand that contractual or other evidence will be necessary to rebut
the presumptions and to avoid liability. 1 Moreover, when employment
is at issue, this Article explicitly defines the operative presumptions.
Thus, minority shareholders will know when they can successfully
challenge their terminations as oppressive. Correspondingly, majority
shareholders will know when they can terminate a minority shareholder without invoking oppression liability.' In this manner, the

259. See Moll, supranote 29, at 559-62.
260. See supratext accompanying notes 253-57.
261. In theory, there may be instances where the minority shareholder will need to rebut a
presumption created by the hypothetical bargains. For example, if the minority wants to
eliminate the majority's discretion to terminate for misconduct or incompetence, the minority
will need proof to rebut the presumption that termination on these grounds is proper. See supra
notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
262. See Gerard P. Tishler & Jennifer R. Searle, Merola v. Exergen Corporation: Lawful
Termination of a Minority Shareholder'sEmployment (Absent a Legitimate Business Purpose),41
BOSTON B.J. 6, 7 (Jan. 1997) (observing that judicial decisions "have offered little in the way of
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modified minority perspective, as explained by this Article, fosters
more informed investment decisions by minority shareholders as well
as more informed business decisions by majority shareholders.
Even if a modified minority perspective is not adopted, this Article has provided a broader discussion of the distinctions between the
perspectives. At the very least, therefore, this broader discussion
should assist courts in evaluating the various oppression definitions
and approaches. Similarly, such a discussion should give litigants a
better sense of their rights in a particular jurisdiction.
F. The Implications of the Modified Minority Perspective
1. Liability for Profitable Corporate Action
At first glance, incorporating the understandings from the hypothetical bargains into a modified minority oppression analysis appears to have striking implications. After all, if a modified minority
court presumptively enforced these understandings in its reasonable
expectations inquiry, the majority shareholder would be prohibited
from taking certain actions that are undeniably in the corporation's
interest. Put more strongly, the shareholder oppression doctrine would
compel a close corporation to be less profitable in certain situations.'
When the typical shareholder's rationale for investing in a
close corporation is considered, however, this implication is much
more palatable. Indeed, maximizing the profitability of the corporation
should not be understood as the sole (or even primary) basis for the
investment of the typical close corporation shareholder. As mentioned,
corporate profitability is only one component of the typical close corporation shareholder's investment-a component that is often of less
importance than the employment aspect of the investment.' The
critical point to add, however, is that acceptance of the understandings from the hypothetical bargains necessarily implies that the majority shareholder has assented to limitations on her ability to make

operational direction for applying [oppression] principles to either minority shareholders who
find themselves discharged from employment or majority shareholders who announce their
terminations'); see also Thompson, supra note 37, at 224 (noting that a judicial role would not be
attractive "if the possibility of later judicial interference itself created uncertainties).
263. It should be noted that public corporations are, to some extent, permitted to act in ways
that are not designed (at least directly) to increase profits. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 122(9) (1991) (allowing corporations to "[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes'); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502(a)(14) (1999) (allowing
corporations to grant "allowances or pensions" to the dependents of deceased directors, officers,
and employees).
264. See supranotes 189-92 and accompanying text.
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profit-maximizing decisions. If one accepts these understandings, in
other words, one necessarily accepts that the majority shareholder has
agreed to limitations on her power.' Indeed, the understandings
represent the product of compromises entered into by the majority
shareholder at the outset of the business in order to induce the minority shareholders to commit their capital to the venture." The understandings are "terms," therefore, that set the ground rules for the
operation of the company.
Viewed in this manner, the shareholder oppression doctrine is
merely enforcing the terms of the deal as understood by all parties at
the inception of the enterprise. In other words, the understandings
from the hypothetical bargains convey that, from the outset, all of the
shareholders presumptively understood (1) that corporate profitability
was only one component of the investment "deal," and (2) that corporate profitability could not necessarily be pursued at the expense of
the other investment components. Thus, when the majority shareholder subsequently asserts that enhancing corporate profits justifies
harming other aspects of the minority's investment, the majority's
conduct should be viewed as an impermissible attempt to change the
terms of the deal that she knowingly accepted and that she knew the
minority shareholders had relied on in deciding to commit their capital to the business."
Further, it is worth noting that the majority shareholder likely
agrees with these terms that she has knowingly accepted. Indeed, at
the outset of the venture, attaching primary importance to the "individual" investment components (e.g., employment, management participation) rather than to the "enterprise' investment component (e.g.,
corporate profitability) is normally consistent with the majority's
interests as well. After all, the typical majority shareholder has often
left prior employment herself to join the speculative start-up
business.' Of course, it is hard to imagine the majority shareholder

265. These 'limitations" are imposed on matters that affect the shareholders' individual
rights and not on general matters relating to the conduct of the corporation's business. See infra

note 280 and accompanying text.
266. See supratext accompanying notes 210, 218.
267. In this context, the majority shareholder should be viewed as simply appropriating a
portion of the minority's investment to further the majority's own interests. See, e.g., O'Neal,
supra note 75, at 887 ("Not to provide a remedy in circumstances of this kind is to permit the
majority shareholders to exploit the minority shareholder's investment solely for their own
benefit.'); Prentice, supranote 90, at 134 (same).
268. See, e.g., Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(involving a close corporation majority shareholder who left prior employment with a large public
company to form the close corporation); see also 1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 1:03, at
4 ("Quite commonly when a participant invests in a close corporation he expects to work in the
business on a full-time basis.").
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firing herself to benefit the corporation. In some sense, therefore, the
modified minority perspective is simply conveying that the majority
cannot do to the minority what it would not do to itself. 9
Thus, although the shareholder oppression doctrine does compel a close corporation to be less profitable in certain situations, such a
result is appropriate because it conforms with the understandings
presumptively reached by the minority and majority investors. 70
Moreover, such a result is fair because the majority knew that these
understandings were relied on by the minority stockholders in committing their capital to the business.27 ' Finally, such a result is necessary because it preserves a critical source of start-up capital for future
ventures. Given that investors commit their capital to close corporations in reliance on the "terms" represented by the understandings
from the hypothetical bargains, the law's refusal to enforce those
terms would presumably diminish available capital over time and
prevent some close corporations from forming.7 Thus, enforcing the

269. This version of the "golden rule" could also support a pure minority perspective. After
all, it is hard to imagine the majority shareholder firing herself for any reason, including her own
misconduct or incompetence. If the majority shareholder is unwilling to enforce the terms of the
hypothetical bargains against herself, it seems perfectly appropriate for the law to prohibit the
majority from selectively applying the bargains against the minority. Put differently, if the
majority shareholder can maintain her job even when majority misconduct or incompetence is
present, perhaps the minority shareholder should have the same "right' to continued employment even when minority misconduct or incompetence is present.
270. See Bradley, supra note 101, at 840 ("The majority shareholders understand that the
minority shareholders have not entered the venture knowingly taking the investment risk that
they may have to suffer the deprivation of any meaningful governance input or share in economic
return because they have submitted to the exercise of an undiluted and untempered majority
power short of fraud, misappropriations or breach of fiduciary duty.).
271. Indeed, the understandings from the hypothetical bargains suggest that the minority
shareholders would have refused to invest in the business if these understandings had not been
reached. See supratext accompanying notes 210, 218.
272. As commentators have observed:
[A] potential source of much-needed risk capital for small business enterprises is threat.
ened by the prevalence of squeeze-outs. Most small businesses depend largely upon individuals in the local community for risk capital. Certainly the frequency of squeeze-outs
and the dire consequences to the squeezees have become well-known to many prospective
investors. Undoubtedly, some persons, because of the dangers of oppression in a close
corporation, choose to purchase securities in public-issue corporations or even permit
their accumulated funds to remain idle rather than risk the purchase of a minority interest in a closely held enterprise.
Most small businesses cannot enter national credit markets.... As the sources of equity
capital open to large corporations are not available to small businesses, it is all the more
important that investment in small businesses be made attractive to local investors and
that they be given full assurance that they will receive just treatment at the hands of
their fellow participants.
1 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supranote 14, § 1:04, at 8.
Businesses may still commence, of course, in a non-corporate form. Indeed, to the extent that
investors fear the possibility of a freeze-out, the business could simply commence as a partner-
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understandings from the hypothetical bargains may result in an economic benefit that outweighs any drag on corporate profitability.2 3
2. Liability for 'egal"

Majority Conduct

A related implication stems from incorporating the hypothetical bargain understandings into the modified minority oppression
analysis. Some of the majority's actions will trigger oppression liability even though the actions are permissible under the state's corporation statute, the company's charter, and the company's bylaws.
Despite the seeming "legality" of these majority actions, however, close
corporation shareholders should not be viewed as consenting to the
default norm of majority rule and the default assumption that company benefit equals shareholder benefit.27' Indeed, acceptance of the
hypothetical bargain understandings necessarily implies that the
shareholders entered into a presumptive arrangement regarding the
operation of the business that was intended to supplant the corresponding legal norms. 5 Put differently, although the majority conduct
is facially "proper" when measured against the statutes and bylaws,
the modified minority perspective recognizes that the conduct may
actually be "improper" to the extent that it breaches the shareholders'
presumptive understandings regarding the operation of their business.'s Characterizing the shareholder oppression doctrine as a pun-

ship or other non-corporate structure that presents little, if any, danger of a freeze-out. See, e.g.,
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 31(1)(b), 31(2), 38 (permitting the dissolution of a partnership by the
express will of any partner, and allowing the partner to recover the amount of his partnership
interest upon dissolution).
273. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 50 (noting that limiting the majority
shareholder's ability to freeze-out the minority shareholder "may well facilitate equity investments in close corporations).
274. See Bradley, supra note 101, at 840 ("Minority shareholders should not be understood as
having agreed that the venture is to be operated strictly as a majority-rule entity with the
economic chips falling as they may.").
275. Cf. CARY & EISENBERG, supranote 33, at 402 (stating that "enabling" schemes "serve[]
principally to validate specific types of arrangements the parties may make"); JAMES D. COX,
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS 33 (1997) (noting that "[m]odern
business corporation statutes are primarily 'enabling' acts").
276. As one commentator observed:
It is no answer to say that majority shareholders are simply exercising powers and rights
that the corporation act and the corporation's charter and bylaws give them, or that when
a shareholder enters into a corporation he "contracts" with his fellow shareholders
against the background of the act, charter and bylaws, and that those instruments become part of the contract. A "contract" among shareholders in a close corporation which
is based entirely on the corporation act and the corporation's charter and bylaws and
gives no effect to the understandings and assumptions of the parties may be so one-sided,
in that holders of a majority of the corporation's shares can at their whim deprive a minority shareholder of any participation in the business or of any return on his investment
(akin to taking his property without any compensation and without due process of law),
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isher of "legal" majority conduct is, therefore, misleading. In actuality,
the doctrine functions as an enforcer of mutual and relied-upon understandings " that were intended to displace the related provisions of
the formal bylaws and statutory norms. '8

that a court would be fully justified in refusing to enforce the contract on the ground that
it is "unconscionable."
O'Neal, supra note 75, at 888; see In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ('This
Court... recognizes that in a close corporation the bargain of the participants is often not
reflected in the corporation's charter, by-laws nor even in separate signed agreements.'); O'Neal,
supranote 75, at 886 ("In a close corporation, the corporation's charter and bylaws almost never
reflect the full business bargain of the participants.'); id. at 887 ("[Acts] which, in law, are a
valid exercise of powers conferred by the articles may nevertheless be entirely outside what can
fairly be regarded as having been in the contemplation of the parties when they became members of the company." (internal quotation omitted)); id. ("[E]ven when there has been nothing
done in excess of power it is necessary to consider whether the situation which has arisen is not
quite outside what the parties contemplated.., and whether what has been done is not contrary
to the assumptions which were the foundation of their agreement.'); Prentice, supra note 90, at
134 (finding unsatisfactory the argument "that the minority shareholder has no one to fault but
himself in that his exclusion from participation in the management of the company is merely a
consequence of the contract between himself and the company established by the articles of
association, a contract which putatively he has freely entered into," and noting that "[i]n establishing the nature of the relationship between the members of a private company, it is necessary
for the courts to go beyond the provisions in the articles of association and in addition to take
into consideration the expectations of the parties when the company was originally formed"
(footnote omitted)); see also Chittur, supranote 204, at 159 (stating that "[t]he public corporation
can be viewed as a standard form multiparty contract, some of the terms of which are specified
by statute," and noting that "[tihe close corporation does not involve the same 'standard form'
contract, or the consequential grant of power"); Prentice, supranote 90, at 146 ("Where [expectations] have been interfered with or are in some way unfulfilled, then this should prima facie
constitute oppression whether or not there was any legal impropriety.').
277. Aside from enforcing these mutual understandings, it is critical to note that the shareholder oppression doctrine gives them legal significance. Indeed, if mutual "understandings"
rose to the level of "agreements," the law of contracts could enforce them and the shareholder
oppression doctrine would presumably be unnecessary. At some level, therefore, the development of the oppression doctrine is evidence that these "understandings" do fall short of established contracts and that some other legal theory is needed to protect them. Without the
shareholder oppression doctrine, in other words, these "understandings" are legally insignificant.
With the shareholder oppression doctrine, however, these "understandings" become legallyprotected interests.
278. If the majority shareholder has acted in furtherance of a legitimate business purpose
and without any improper freeze-out considerations, the relief granted to the minority shareholder could be structured to account for this lack of "majority fault." See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that the court may award fair value "plus or minus any
adjustment deemed equitable by the court"); Hillman, supra note 27, at 76 ("If the matter is
approached as independent of the issue of misconduct, relief may be tailored to reflect the
absence of wrongful conduct by those in control of the venture.). Perhaps adjustments in the
technique utilized to value the minority's holdings could be made. See, e.g., Id. at 82 (noting that
"the highest valuation might be achieved by utilizing an earnings-based method," and indicating
that "the use of a method based upon the liquidation value of corporate assets.., can be expected to result in a lower figure than other approaches'). But see Moll, supra note 29, at 568-80
(explaining that a conventional earnings-based buyout already fails to compensate the oppressed
shareholder for the employment and management aspects of his investment). Perhaps some
combination of minority and marketability discounts could be employed to reduce the amount
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3. Limited Majority Discretion

As the last two sections have illustrated, the modified minority
perspective limits the majority shareholder's discretion to act in furtherance of the corporation's interests. Indeed, majority actions that
further a legitimate business purpose may still give rise to liability
under a modified minority oppression analysis. As mentioned, when
the understandings from the hypothetical bargains are considered,
this limited discretion is appropriate."'
More importantly, however, this limited discretion is not as restrictive as it may seem. First, the majority's discretion is only limited
for decisions that impact the rights of individual shareholders. For
more general decisions, such as the choice of one business opportunity
over another, the modified minority perspective would not limit the
majority's prerogatives." Second, because the understandings from
the hypothetical bargains create rebuttable presumptions, the majority shareholder can always insure that she will have discretion to act
in the corporation's interest by explicitly setting forth that discretion
in a contract with the minority shareholders."' Finally, the majority's
discretion will not be limited at all if the majority (or the corporation)
is willing to buy out the holdings of the oppressed minority shareholder.' For these reasons, the adoption of the modified minority

owed to the minority shareholder. See, e.g., 2 O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 7.15, at 11516; Bahls, supra note 14, at 301-04. Finally, perhaps the terms of the buyout could be manipulated to prevent the possibility of the corporation facing a significant cash drain. See, e.g.,
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 572-73 (N.C. 1983) (Martin, J., concurring) ('If it is
determined that the granting of relief will be unduly burdensome to the corporation or other
shareholders, the trial court should consider this in determining whether to grant relief and, if
so, whether this should affect the purchase price or value attached to plaintiffs shares or the
method of payment.'); Bahls, supra note 14, at 328 n.258 ("Several state statutes permit the
courts to order installment payments.'); Hillman, supranote 27, at 83 (discussing the possibility
of "structur[ing] installment payments with a commercially reasonable rate of interest over an
extended period of time!).
Of course, all of these suggestions diminish the amount that the minority shareholder
receives as compensation for her investment. It is the majority shareholder, however, that has
violated the mutual understandings of the parties. The minority shareholder, by contrast, has
upheld her end of the deal. Thus, to the extent that these "adjustments" serve to diminish the
minority's investment value, one could question whether they should be considered at all.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 270-73.
280. See Cox, supra note 144, at 631 ('Though great flexibility should be accorded managers
on matters related to the conduct of the corporation's business, this is not necessarily the case
regarding decisions that impact the relative rights of owners' interests in the firm. The former is
more clearly the type of business activity which is best lodged with the firm's managers; the
latter is not.") (footnote omitted).
281. See supranotes 255-56 and accompanying text.
282. As mentioned, the prevalent remedy for shareholder oppression is a buyout of the oppressed investor's holdings. See supranote 184 and accompanying text. Support for the buyout
remedy exists in half the states, although the relevant statutes and judicial decisions differ in
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perspective and the presumptive understandings does not impose an
unreasonable burden on the majority shareholder.'
4. The End of Business Judgment Rule Deference
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with board
decisions involving employment, management, or dividend matters.'
Indeed, when the majority's decisions on such matters are challenged,
the courts often invoke the business judgment rule and its accompa-

their operation. See Thompson, supra note 35, at 718. In some states, the corporation or the
shareholders are permitted by statute to purchase the shares of a minority shareholder seeking
involuntary dissolution. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.630 (Michie 1989); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2000 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1189 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751 (subd. 2) (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) (West 1992); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985); RMBCA
§ 14.34(a) (1993). In other states, statutes authorize a court to order a buyout as one of several
possible remedies in dissolution proceedings or in other litigation between shareholders. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-216 (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1123 (West
1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1994); MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP. SUPP.
§§ 41, 42 (1993). Courts have also ordered buyouts as part of their general equitable authority.
See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Davis v. Sheerin, 754
S.W.2d 375, 380, 383 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Thompson, supra note
35, at 720-21 ("Courts increasingly have ordered buyouts of a shareholder's interest by the
corporation or the other shareholders even in the absence of specific statutory authorization.).
The buyout remedy is not limited to dissolution proceedings; indeed, in the absence of a statute,
buyouts have been ordered where a breach of fiduciary duty has been found. See id. at 723.
A buyout remedy provides the shareholder with the 'Tairvalue" of his investment. See supra
note 185 and accompanying text. In a sense, therefore, the modified minority perspective limits
the discretion of the close corporation majority shareholder only to the extent that the majority
(or the corporation) is unwilling to bear the expense of a 'fair value" buyout. See 2 O'NEAL,
OPPRESSION, supra note 14, § 10:09, at 60 ('The buy-out feature in these statutes is desirable
because it permits shareholderswho want to preserve the enterprise as a going concern to buy out
dissenters,and at the same time it provides an oppressed shareholder a fair price for his holdings." (emphasis added)); see also supra note 278 (noting the possibility of a court awarding a
buyout on favorable terms to the majority when "majority fault" is absent). But see Hillman,
supra note 27, at 70-75 (stating that "[tihe assumption that those who desire to avoid a dissolution of the corporate enterprise may easily do so by purchasing the interest of a dissatisfied
minority shareholder ignores a number of problems which may be encountered by those who
wish to continue the venture," and discussing those problems). It should be noted, however, that
the conventional buyout may not compensate the minority shareholder for the employment and
management participation components of her investment. See Moll, supra note 29, at 568-80.
283. Cf. Bradley, supra note 101, at 845 ("Protecting shareholders from mistreatment and
the disappointment of reasonable expectations does not impose an unacceptable constraint on
the majority shareholders' entitlement to flexibility.).
284. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976)
("[Courts fairly consistently have been disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees, which essentially involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority
control.'); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975) ("IT]he plaintiff
will find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies. Such policies are considered
to be within the judgment of the directors." (footnote omitted)).
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nying deference to the majority will.' Because of this traditional
reluctance to interfere with majority decisions, some majority perspective courts may become lenient in their scrutiny of the majority's
legitimate business purpose-so lenient that their analysis resembles
a conventional business judgment rule deference.' Adoption of the
modified minority perspective, however, necessarily implies that a
deferential approach to the actions of the majority shareholder is
inappropriate. Because employment discharges, management removals, and dividend denials can severely harm the value of the close
corporation shareholder's investment, 7 the majority's decision to take
one or more of such actions must be legitimately scrutinized by a court
to insure that the decision conforms to the understandings from the
hypothetical bargains. Thus, because the modified minority perspective requires more than a surface inquiry into the majority's conduct,

285. See, e.g., Peeples, supra note 69, at 469 ('The declaration of dividends is always at the
discretion of the board of directors. The business judgment rule protects such a decision."
(footnote omitted)); id. at 477 ('CThe hiring, firing, and compensation of employees are ultimately
board decisions and have always qualified as management decisions protected by the business
judgment rule.'); Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 47 n.125 ('The business judgment rule is seldom
overcome on dividend questions.'); supranote 281.
The business judgment rule "immunizes management from liability in corporate transaction[s] undertaken within both power of corporation and authority of management when there is
[a] reasonable basis to indicate that [the] transaction was made with due care and in good faith."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1990). Under the business judgment rule, the majority's
substantive business decision is reviewed with a minimal level of scrutiny. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supranote 48, at 93 ("Statements of the rule vary;, its terms are far less important than
the fact that [it] is a specially deferential approach.'); Cox, supra note 144, at 628 (mentioning
the "deferential presumptions dictated by the business judgment rule"). As Professors Cary and
Eisenberg have observed, "under the [business judgment] rule the substance or quality of the
director's or officer's decision will be reviewed, not under the basic standard of conduct to determine whether the decision was prudent or reasonable, but only under a much more limited
standard." CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 33, at 603. In general, that more limited standard is
mere rationality-i.e., a substantive business decision need only be "rational," as opposed to
"reasonable," to be considered proper. See id. ("[Tihe prevalent formulation of the standard of
review of a substantive decision under the business-judgment rule is that the decision must be
'rational."'); Cox, supra note 144, at 629 (noting that "the standard business judgment rule
approach ... uphold[s] unequal treatment on a showing of rational business judgment"). Under
such a minimal standard of review, almost any justification advanced by the majority to defend
its allegedly oppressive actions will survive judicial scrutiny. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note
33, at 604 ('The rationality standard of review is much easier for a defendant to satisfy than a
prudence or reasonability standard.... It is common to characterize a person's conduct as
imprudent or unreasonable, but it is very uncommon to characterize a person's conduct as
irrational.").
286. See Hillman, supranote 27, at 45 n.139 ("A court may also show great tolerance towards
those in control by justifying questionable conduct as within the business judgment of the
directors and officers.'); see, e.g., Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366-67
(Mont. 1990); see also supra note 204 and accompanying text.
287. See supranotes 189-190 and accompanying text.
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conventional notions regarding the applicability of the business judgment rule must be disregarded.
At first glance, such bucking of tradition may seem like a startling proposition. It is important to note, however, that much of the
core rationale for the business judgment rule is simply inapplicable in
a close corporation context. Indeed, when market restraints are present, as in a public corporation, invoking the business judgment rule is
sensible:
[T]he business judgment rule is a judicial expression of faith in the free market. If
management in a public corporation performs well and corporate earnings rise, the increase in profitability will be reflected in the stock price. No necessity arises for judges
to review decisions and strike down bad ones, because that is done by the market.... Poor performance of the management could lead to more drastic consequences.
It could invite proxy fights or takeover bids, and thus threaten management's lucrative
employment positions. Self-interest ensures that there is an incentive to good performance.... Judicial review is replaced for the better by a properly functioning market,
because the market constantly reviews a corporation's performance and has immediate
economic weapons to deal with mismanagement that are unavailable to the
judiciary.'88

In a close corporation, however, market restraints are not present. As
a consequence, this core rationale for the business judgment rule is
inapplicable:
The close corporation is not comparably reviewed or controlled by the market because
it has no publicly traded stock. There is little possibility of a proxy fight or a takeover
bid. In a close corporation, management has tremendous job security, which is often
why the principals decided to incorporate. The absence of judicial review remains unsubstituted. Because of the absence of judicial review, the business judgment rule is
worse, it is often an abdication of judicial
not an expression of faith in the free market;
9
responsibility to protect the powerless.2

288. Chittur, supra note 204, at 158. Professors Hetherington and Dooley express similar
sentiments:
Market restraints are most visible and workable in the case of publicly held corporations.
If management is inefficient, indulges its own preferences, or otherwise acts contrary to
shareholder interests, dissatisfied shareholders will sell their shares and move to more
attractive investment opportunities. As more shareholders express their dissatisfaction
by selling, the market price of the company's shares will decline to the point where existing management is exposed to the risk of being displaced through a corporate takeover.... The mere threat of displacement, whether or not realized, is a powerful
incentive for managers of publicly held corporations to promote their shareholders' interests so as to keep the price of the company's shares as high and their own positions as secure as possible.
Hetherington & Dooley, supranote 1, at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
289. Chittur, supranote 204, at 158 (footnote omitted); see id. at 155 ("When courts dismiss
actions by minority shareholders under doctrinal corporate defenses, such as the business
judgment rule, hostage-taking has a judicial guardian. A refusal to 'interfere in the legitimate
business decisions of a corporation just to resolve a dispute between majority and minority
shareholders' is in reality, a conferrence of legitimacy on decisions that might have little to do
with business." (footnote omitted) (quoting Iwasaki v. Iwasaki Bros., 69 P.2d 598, 601 (1982)));
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Because the market-based underpinnings of the business judgment
rule are absent in the close corporation context,' close corporation
decisions call for more judicial scrutiny than the conventional business
judgment rule deference."l To the extent that the scrutiny of majority
perspective courts begins to resemble this deference, such laxity is
inappropriate. When employment, management, or dividend matters
are at issue in the close corporation, the adoption of the modified
minority perspective and the presumptive understandings conveys
that a closer judicial look is needed."
VI. CONCLUSION

Courts and commentators have not fully considered the differences between the majority and minority perspectives of shareholder

see also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 48 ('The preferred status of the majority [in a
close corporation] is more likely to be an inadvertent product of a failure to appreciate the
importance of market forces in the regulatory scheme for business organizations.').
290. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 n.18 (Conn. 1994)
('The market for corporate control serves to constrain managers' conduct that does not maximize
shareholder wealth. It therefore serves to align the interests of managers more closely with the
interests of shareholders in publicly traded corporations. The market for corporate control does
not affect, however, the incentives of managers of closely held corporations.'); supra Part V.A. 1.
291. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 203, at 291; see also supra note 289 and accompanying text. Indeed, as Professors Easterbrook and Fischel explain:
It could be argued that judges should treat the acts of managers of close corporations with suspicion, however, because of the absence of the disciplinary effects of
the stock market and other market mechanisms. One rationale for the business
judgment rule is that managers who make errors (and even those who engage in
self-dealing) are penalized by market forces while judges who make errors are
not. Thus managers have better incentives to make correct business decisions
than do judges. But if neither managers nor courts are disciplined by market
forces, this justification has less force.
For example, the decision to terminate an employee in a publicly held corporation is a
classic example of the exercise of business judgment that a court would not second guess.
In a closely held corporation, by contrast, termination of an employee can be a way to appropriate a disproportionate share of the firm's earnings. It makes sense, therefore, to
have greater judicial review of terminations of managerial (or investing) employees in
closely held corporations than would be consistent with the business judgment rule. The
same approach could be used with salary, dividend, and employment decisions in closely
held corporations where the risks of conflicts of interest are greater.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 203, at 291-93 (emphasis added); see also Chittur, supra note
204, at 156-61 (arguing that the business judgment rule is inappropriate for the close corporation); O'Neal, supra note 75, at 884-85 (criticizing the application of the business judgment rule
to close corporations). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supranote 203, at 291 ("On the other hand,
the smaller number of participants in closely held corporations ensures that managers bear more
of the costs of their actions and facilitates contractual arrangements between the parties to
reduce the likelihood of self-dealing. The differences between publicly and closely held corporations, in other words, do not suggest unambiguously that the level of judicial scrutiny should
vary or, if it does, in what direction.').
292. See supra note 291.
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oppression. Although characterizing the perspectives as "not contradictory" and having "little difference" in practice is accurate in the
typical freeze-out scenario, this Article has argued that the choice of
oppression perspective is of critical significance outside of this context.
By exploring the distinctions between the pure and modified formulations of the perspectives, this Article has demonstrated that the success or failure of an oppression claim may turn entirely on the
perspective from which shareholder oppression is viewed.
Recognizing that the choice of perspective is important, however, reveals a larger question that courts and commentators have
overlooked-which perspective is superior? In assessing the various
perspectives, this Article has argued that the right question inquires
into what the shareholders would have bargained for at the venture's
inception. The right answer, therefore, is not a perspective that allows
the close corporation investment to be harmed whenever any legitimate business purpose is served. Given the special nature of the close
corporation investment, reasonable close corporation shareholders
would have rejected such a 'legitimate business purpose" arrangement
had they bargained over it. As a consequence, the majority perspective-in both pure and modified formulations-fails to conform to the
expectations held by the typical close corporation shareholder. The
"less harmful alternative" restriction does not alter this conclusion, as
it will likely be construed to favor corporate interests. Simply put,
both formulations of the majority perspective insufficiently protect the
unique components of the close corporation investment. Thus, neither
formulation can be accepted as the superior oppression perspective.
The modified minority perspective, however, properly protects
the distinctive expectations of the typical close corporation shareholder, as well as the various components of the close corporation
investment. Indeed, this Article has established that the modified
minority perspective is the only approach with the flexibility to enforce the likely understandings that reasonable close corporation
shareholders would have bargained for at the inception of the venture.
Whereas the pure minority perspective overprotects the minority's
interests, the modified minority perspective's enforcement of these
understandings strikes the appropriate balance between protecting
the minority's investment and preserving the majority's discretion. As
a consequence, such an approach should be viewed as the superior
oppression perspective.
In short, the choice between majority and minority perspectives
can make an outcome-determinative difference. The question of perspective, therefore, is a question that demands an answer. By demon-
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strating the superiority of the modified minority perspective, this
Article has provided one.

